Sympathetic Vibratory Physics -It's a Musical Universe!
 
Institutionalized Tyranny: The Character & Color of Authority
(Revision 4 -- Oct. 1, 1998)

By Dan Meador ©

Introduction

In the last decade, increasing numbers of men and women have joined the effort to unravel how Federal, State, and local governments make what amount to end runs around constitutional limitations. The purpose of this composition is to bring the fruit of the best research into focus, and construct a reasonably comprehensive picture of the macabre scheme that undermines sovereignty and solvency of the nation.

The Scheme & Its Effect

Governments of the United States, the Union of several States, and possessions of the United States are embroiled in a scheme known as Cooperative Federalism, sometimes identified simply as Federalism. The nonconstitutional scheme presumes that each of the several States is an instrumentality of the United States on a par with insular possessions of the United States{1}, rather than semi-independent State republics, (1) restricted only by constitutional prohibitions and mandates, and (2) subject only to constitutionally-enumerated powers of the United States.

This scheme was made possible by emergence of a second government. Yet even today, those not familiar with the two capacities of United States government find it difficult to grasp implications. However, some who held responsible positions when the second or shadow government emerged saw the danger. Justice Harlan, a justice on the Supreme Court of the United States, was among them. One of his more lucid criticisms was written in his dissenting opinion in Downes v. Bidwell (1901), the first of four insular tax cases that provided a conceptual platform for the current de facto (authority in fact, but without law) system that engulfs not only insular possessions of the United States, but State republics party to the Constitution:

The United States, via constitutionally-delegated powers which are statutorily activated by Congress, carries out certain responsibilities in relation to the several States party to the Constitution and the people of the several States, but Congress has what is described as plenary or near-absolute power in territory belonging to the United States. The insular tax cases addressed a unique situation: Insular possessions ceded by Spain in 1898 following the Spanish-American War were the first territories acquired by the United States where the cession treaty did not incorporate the territory and people in the constitutional scheme. Consequently, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and other provinces ceded by Spain were to become more like British Crown colonies than territory previously acquired by the United States.

This division, and limited application of the Constitution, was what alarmed Justice Harlan and others who clearly understood that a house divided cannot stand -- that the "permissive" would eventually overcome the "restrictive" government. They were correct. Cooperative Federalism, known as Corporatism into the 1930s, evolved to crowd out legitimate government required to operate within the confines of constitutionally-enumerated powers.

Since the 1930s great depression and World War II, fraudulent economic policy, and mathematically impossible credit and monetary systems, have undermined American sovereignty and solvency, resulting in agonizing rural poverty and cancerous growth of the urban ghetto. The effect of wealth transfer since the early 1970s has all but destroyed the nation's middle and upper-middle income classes. Benefits flow to only about twenty percent of the population, while windfalls funnel to the wealthiest quarter of one percent. By the current decade, the Cooperative Federalism system of frauds had ripened to such decadence that it criminalizes tens of thousands without lawful, constitutionally delegated authority, and otherwise engages in thinly disguised piracy perpetrated against many thousands more. Absolutely nobody is safe -- government seeks to control life of virtually all Americans from cradle to grave. Aside from specific industries, the economic assault has been particularly injurious to two broad classes, children and subsequent heirs of the Post War Boomers, and minorities of color.

Distress from the increasingly confrontational system is sufficient that every legitimate key-question survey since 1990 has reflected that sixty percent or more of the nation's eligible voters distrusts politicians and political institutions down to and including local school boards. By September 1995, the distrust level topped 72%, and by May 1996, went over 80%; in November 1996, only 49% of the nation's registered voters bothered to vote, which was a distressing number due largely to only 35-40% of those eligible to vote having even registered. Consequently, few politicians elected in November 1996 represent much more than 10% of the eligible voters in their respective districts. As the last decade of the Twentieth Century draws to an end, national, state, and local governments are probably less representative of the people than at any time since Congress convened under the Constitution in 1789.{3}

In a more pointed survey, approximately 35% of those interviewed expressed manifest and rising anger toward Federal government. The summer 1998 survey abated some from a year earlier, but politicians such as Vice President Al Gore are concerned that what was previously articulated as anger has simply turned to cynicism, in many ways a more dangerous and enduring mindset. Those cynical and angry toward Federal government constitute a significant force approaching half the nation's adult population.

These surveys contradict mainline media pomp and circumstance proclaiming all is well. Americans aren't passive and indifferent to personal and national welfare, generation of wealth, and sovereignty. The vast majority knows something is desperately wrong, but has been mystified and immobilized by a de facto scheme woven in the craft of wordsmiths and deception which has evolved since approximately the Civil War, with what amounted to a constitutional coup de grace in the 1930's. Encroachment has continued at a steady to accelerating pace since, hitting high gear in 1966 and after. By 1990, State and Federal governments incarcerated more people in total numbers and on a per-capita basis than any other nation in the world other than South Africa and the old Soviet Union -- prison industries had become the nation's fifth largest industry. The Department of Justice, to say nothing of corresponding State agencies, the Internal Revenue Service, and other Federal agencies, routinely seizes and/or confiscates in excess of $50 billion per year in privately-owned American assets.{4} This frenzy has gone so overboard that by late 1997 and early 1998, even The Wall Street Journal, Forbes Magazine, and other influential mainline publications were publishing critical articles. In 1998, American incarceration numbers, now at 1.2 million nationally, and in excess of 113,000 in the Federal system, rank second in the world, with the old Soviet Union having the dubious honor of ranking first.

The combined force of adverse economic policy, and abusive administrative, and civil and criminal prosecution initiatives, is rapidly reaching critical mass -- a point where general civil disobedience, and eventually revolution, is inevitable unless something happens to alleviate mounting conflict. Common people feel alienated from and defenseless against their government, symptoms which characteristically lead to backlash and violent confrontation. This is the course of nations and empires throughout history, with nineteen of twenty-one known empires prior to 1935 having fallen from within due to economic collapse and destruction of key social institutions.{5}

Proper enforcement of law has the potential of averting disaster. Cooperative Federalism is imposed through fraud and illusion -- perpetrators operate in a de facto manner without lawful authority, so they are subject to criminal prosecution and civil remedies in lawful State and Federal courts. The problem is forcing those appointed or elected to judicial offices to convene constitutionally-authorized courts, or removing them from office so successors will.

Thanks to the work of patriotic researchers across the nation, keys to unraveling convoluted State and Federal Codes are soundly in place. With solid conceptual footing, energy can be focused on untangling the maze, then deploying strategies to peacefully and lawfully correct the system. Scripture speaks to the matter in two contexts which are fundamental to the effort: The reprobate will be caught in his own snare, and in his second letter to Timothy, the Apostle Paul foretold that the reprobate would proceed no further as he would be exposed for all the world to see. These two approaches are fundamental to peacefully restoring constitutional rule.{6}

The Least Common Denominators

Virtually every Federal initiative in the Union of several States in both civil and criminal actions is defective by virtue of being without lawful authority. All cases are prosecuted in United States District Courts{7} in the name and by authority of the United States of America. At first blush, this process would seem innocent enough, but the underlying difficulty is akin to remembering if the order of stripes on the deadly coral snake is red then black, or red then yellow. The United States District Court isn't what it seems; the 'United States of America' isn't what it seems, either.

These are fatal flaws. Only district courts of the United States, as defined at 28 U.S.C. § 451{8} (Section 451 of Title 28 of the United States Code), and three remaining territorial courts{9}, are courts of the United States. United States District Courts situated in the Union of several States are private courts; they do not exercise Article III or Article I (legislative-territorial) judicial authority of the United States.

The Article III district court was defined in a 1938 Supreme Court decision styled Mookini v. United States, as follows:

The legitimate territorial court, designated as a United States District Court, was defined by the Supreme Court in Balzac v. Porto Rico in 1922:

One of the better listings of "courts of the United States" is the definition of courts which the Administrative Office of Courts of the United States has jurisdiction over, at 28 U.S.C. § 610. However, this list is dated. Since the definition was last amended, the United States District Court for the Canal Zone has been abolished, and the territorial court (United States District Court) for the Northern Mariana Islands has been added:

A somewhat different but maybe clearer approach is used in the definition at 28 U.S.C. § 1869(f). This subsection 'defines' what courts of the United States are authorized by statute to convene grand and petit (trial) juries, and effectively bridges civil and criminal so far as lawful courts of the United States are concerned:

Criminal jurisdiction of the United States, found at 18 U.S.C. § 3231, is vested in "district courts of the United States", not "United States District Courts", and the same is true in civil forums in title 28 of the United States Code.{12} Sections of the Code which reflect jurisdiction similar to district courts of the United States in territorial courts are found for the most part in title 48, Territories and Insular Possessions. The Virgin Islands territorial court is unique in that it is vested with concurrent maritime jurisdiction at 18 U.S.C. § 3241. However, the 'territorial' jurisdiction can and does extend only to the insular possession itself, along with territorial waters. The Canal Zone territorial court had concurrent admiralty and maritime jurisdiction until it was abolished, and prior to admission as States of the Union, concurrent maritime jurisdiction was vested in various of the territorial courts.

No Article III or Article I jurisdiction of the United States is vested in United States District Courts situated in the Union of several States party to the Constitution. They are not courts created by Congress -- they are private courts created by a judicial consortium. These folks garbed in black were for the most part appointed under authority of Article III § 1 of the Constitution to preside in lawful courts of the United States, but without constitutional or statutory authority, elected to set up a system of private court system which operates under the territorial illusion.

Whenever territories of the United States were admitted to the Union, Article I territorial courts were replaced by Article III district courts of the United States. Prior to the 1920s, however, there doesn't seem to have been any real distinction in text so far as the district court of the United States v. the United States District Court is concerned. The problem was resolved via Supreme Court definition in Balzac v. Porto Rico (1922), cited elsewhere. However, in at least some legislation, court nomenclature was avoided, as was the case in the judiciary act of March 3, 1911 in statutory language governing transition from territorial to Article III courts. The fact that the territorial courts were abolished with admittance of a territory to the Union of several States party to the Constitution is verified in §§ 62-64 of the act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1104:

The sections above were derived from §§ 567-568 of the Revised Statutes of 1878, page 97, so they weren't new in 1911 or even 1878, but originated a considerable time before. They clearly demonstrate that the nature of courts of the United States is an either/or proposition: Either they must be district courts of the United States, vested with judicial power of the United States via Article III of the Constitution, or they must be Article I legislative courts, with territorial courts having jurisdiction limited to territory subject to Congress' Article IV § 3.2 legislative authority. There is no statutory provision or justification for maintaining territorial courts once a territory of the United States is admitted to the Union of several States. When a territory is admitted to the Union, only Article III courts of the United States may make determinations that deprive the sovereign people of life, liberty, or property. The Fifth Article of Amendment, as well as the 'arising under' clause at Article III § 2.1 of the Constitution, cannot be abridged by Congress or the judicial branch of government.

Restating the obvious, United States District Courts situated in the several States are not Article III district courts of the United States, and they are not Article I territorial courts, known as United States District Courts. It is fair to say that they are 'outlaw' courts -- courts which do not exist by laws of the United States promulgated by Congress, and do not exercise judicial authority of the United States.

This is not conjecture. Judges and the court clerk in the Eastern District of Kentucky have effectively confessed this conclusion in administrative and judicial forums. Law of the United States speaks clearly to the matter. Litigation is already filed in the Eastern District of Kentucky with the mandate to convene the Article III district court of the United States, with an affidavit of bias and prejudice that disqualifies all judges appointed to the district, the object being to force the Chief Judge of the 6th Circuit to convene the constitutionally-authorized district court. The contention is supported by a letter from the office of the General Counsel for the Administrative Office of Courts of the United States. As of this writing, these initiatives are stalemated by inaction, but there has been no rebuttal to the obvious conclusions or legitimacy of the initiatives.

The character of the United States District Court is addressed several times in the body of this discourse, so we will leave it here for now.

Next, it is particularly important to understand that the "United States of America" responsible for civil and criminal initiatives in United States District Courts is a government foreign to the United States that has no constitutional or statutory authority in the several States party to the Constitution. Where United States government has two capacities or characters, there are two distinct political alliances or coalitions named the "United States of America".

The original United States of America, spelled with capital first letters, was comprised of the thirteen original States joined to fight the American war of independence, and was formally established in Article I of the Articles of Confederation (1777). This same "United States of America" appears in the Preamble of the Constitution of the United States: "We the People of the United States..," "established the Constitution, " "... for the United States of America." The United States of America also has a function in Article II of the Constitution: By way of electoral college, the President is elected President of the United States of America, then at his inauguration is sworn in by oath as President of the United States.

The relationship of the Union of several States party to the Constitution, designated as the United States of America in the Articles of Confederation, is somewhat on the order of member nations who participate in the United Nations. By way of charter, signatory nations established the United Nations, but the charter does not vest unilateral authority in any of the participating nations; all actions of the United Nations, regardless of what nations participate, are engaged in the name and by authority of the United Nations. The Constitution of the United States enumerates certain powers vested in the governmental entity known and designated as the United States, not the United States of America.

Analogously, suppose several people decide to undertake an enterprise of some sort. Maybe they want to build cars. They might create a corporation, which is a legal fiction, and the might name the 'agent' responsible for carrying out the enterprise the Ford Motor Corporation, General Motors, Chrysler, or anything else. Likewise, delegates of the United States of America compact could have named the confederation agent anything they wanted to. Rather than the "United States", they might have named the designated governmental entity the 'Confederated Authority'. The sense of what they did is related in the first three articles of the Articles of Confederation:

Essentially the same limitations on United States authority is articulated in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution:

Obviously, even the original United States of America had no significant constitutionally delegated powers -- the Constitution was "for" the United States of America, its primary function was to delegate authority to the United States as the general government agent, and therefore, the Constitution is the Constitution of the United States. The original draft of the Constitution made at the Constitutional Convention actually doesn't have a title. The title was later added for classification and other purposes, but the intent is clear even without the title. But substituting the "United States of America" for the "United States" as the principal of interest in Federal civil and criminal initiatives is only the beginning of fraud.

The United States of America currently responsible for Federal civil and criminal initiatives is not the original. It is a political coalition, compact or alliance of insular possessions of the United States subject to sovereignty of the United States via Congress' plenary power (near-absolute) in territory belonging to the United States under authority of Article IV, Sec. 3, cl. 2 of the Constitution.{13} By way of various sections of the United States Code, delegations of authority, treaties, etc., we know the substitute "United States of America" is territorial, it is a jurisdiction foreign to the United States, and it is defined as an agency of the United States (see notes following 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and 18 U.S.C. § 6, 1994 edition, derived from 18 U.S.C. § 80, 1940 edition). The entity is very probably classified or designated as a municipal corporation.

By putting the "United States" and the "United States of America" in the same statute or regulation, the two entities are distinguished as being unique and separate -- the "this is not that" test applies. The following is reproduction of 18 U.S.C. § 80, 1940 ed.:

The general fraud is made possible by the likeness of the two names where the second is a familiar name. For example, years ago when I lived in Oklahoma City, I was listed in the telephone directory as "Dan L. Meador," and there was also a Daniel Meador who was listed as "Dan'l Meador." I occasionally received mail and telephone calls intended for Daniel, and he sometimes received mail and telephone calls intended for me.

Then there is a similar kind of confusion: When I first began attending a university, I kept running into what I thought was the same guy. It was disconcerting because he would show up at places that didn't make sense. I might see him somewhere, then see him a second place and wonder how he had gotten there. The problem was resolved when I saw two of the same guy in the same place -- the two were identical twins.

The example here isn't precisely the same as the "United States" isn't the "United States of America," but knowing there are two entities identified as the "United States of America" helps, then seeing the "United States" and the "United States of America" clearly set out in the same section of the United States Code or the Code of Federal Regulations provides the means for conceptual clarification and orientation. It is clear that, "The United States is not the United States of America," then conclude by way of the Constitution and laws of the United States that the United States, not the United States of America, has lawful authority in the Union of several States party to the Constitution.

Ironically, proper authority is tied together in the Internal Revenue Code at 26 U.S.C. § 7402. This section, in subsection (a), is specific with respect to the "United States" being the lawful principal of interest, and the "district court of the United States" being the court where government may secure lawful remedies:

The "United States' must bring the action -- "... at the instance of the United States..." -- in a "district court of the United States," in all "civil actions."

Making a non-criminal claim or complaint in a court is a "civil action," and it may be in two different forms. It may proceed "in the course of the common law," or "in the course of the civil law." The terminology of law is at best confusing for most people even where there is no deceptive intent, so there is an inherent problem of explaining the meaning of words and phrases even for many people who practice law. The problem is even worse where there is intentional deception, which is the case for the Internal Revenue Code and other titles of the United States Code.

The Internal Revenue Code is full of deception. One example relates to forfeitures. In the Internal Revenue Code, forfeitures are designated as 'in rem' actions, and are to be executed in United States District Courts, this stipulation at 26 U.S.C. § 7323:

The United States District Court is a territorial court, and the in rem action is an admiralty/maritime action, which proceeds "in the course of the civil law," contrary to due process in the course of the common law secured by the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Articles of Amendment, and presumed by the "arising under" clause at Article III § 2.1 of the Constitution. Again it is necessary to understand terminology and implications of terminology to grasp meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 7323. However, with what has already been addressed, we can conclude that the current Internal Revenue Code does not authorize seizures and forfeitures in the Union of several States party to the Constitution -- these portions of the Internal Revenue Code are limited to territorial and maritime jurisdiction of the United States. Thus, 'venue' for forfeitures, venue meaning territorial jurisdiction, is determined in the context of § 7323 by designation of the territorial court rather than the Article III district court of the United States as the court with authority to effect seizures and forfeitures. Only three legitimate territorial courts remain, designated via 1994 legislation at 18 U.S.C. § 23 -- United States District Courts of Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. Therefore, per 26 U.S.C. § 7323, all suits for seizure and forfeiture must be in one of the three remaining territorial courts, not in district courts of the United States situated in the Union of several States party to the Constitution.

That the "United States", not the "United States of America", is the constitutionally and statutorily-authorized principal of interest, and must therefore be the prosecuting party via lawful courts of the United States, is reasonably easy to track through statutory authority relating to revenue laws. By going to the 1934 edition of the United States Code, authority of the "United States" is verified for actions to enforce forfeitures, etc. Authority is found at 28 U.S.C. § 732, 1934 ed., as follows:

The origin of 28 U.S.C. § 732, 1934 ed., is § 919 of the Revised Statutes of 1878, the beginning-place for the United States Code. By going to the Revised Statutes of 1878, we can compare the section with that in the Code to see proper authority:

The 1934 U.S.C. section duplicates § 919 of the Revised Statutes of 1878, the Revised Statutes of 1878 providing the point of demarcation for current law of the United States. Annotation to § 919 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 cite original legislation as follows: Act of 4 Aug., 1790, c. 35, s. 67, v. 1, p. 176. 31 Dec. 1792, c. 1, s. 29, v. 1, p. 298. 18 Feb., 1793, c. 8. s. 35, v. 1, p. 317. 2 Mar., 1799, c. 22, s. 89, v. 1, pp. 695, 696. 13 July, 1866, c. 184, s. 9, v. 14, pp. 111, 145. 8 June, 1872, c. 335, s. 303, v. 17, p. 323.

Additionally, the Supreme Court of the United States has determined authority of the "United States" to sue in the absence of statutory authority specifying the principal. In the absence of statutory authority, or statutes to the contrary, the Attorney General may initiate suit in the name and by authority of the United States (United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888); United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338 (1888); United States v. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888)).

Finally, the matter is ultimately put to rest by the original judiciary act of September 24, 1789. The first section which speaks to authority of the United States is § 9, 1 Stat. 76:

Actions of a civil nature are addressed in 11, 1 Stat. 78:

Duties of the United States Marshal clarify authority of the United States, with no other authority listed, at § 27, 1 Stat. 87:

To close the loop, this same basic charge of responsibility for the U.S. Marshal is found in the 1994 edition of the United States Code at § 566(c):

Nowhere is there constitutional or statutory authority for the "United States of America" to serve as principal of interest in civil or criminal causes in the Union of several States party to the Constitution. This might be a minor thing of no consequence if the "United States of America" wasn't a distinct, separate geographical and political entity foreign to the "United States", but the evidence clearly shows that the United States and the United States of America are distinct and different with distinct and separate geographical authority. There is no other "law or Rule of Procedure" authorizing the United States of America as prosecuting principal in civil or criminal judicial forums; all writs, process, and orders of courts of the United States which the U.S. Marshal's Service may execute must be "issued under the authority of the United States."

In sum, virtually all Federal civil and criminal initiatives against individuals and non-governmental enterprise are filed in private United States District Courts situated in the Union of several States party to the Constitution in the name and by authority of the United States of America, a government foreign to the United States that has no constitutional or statutory authority in the several States party to the Constitution. These are the 'least common denominators' for virtually all Americans assailed in civil and criminal forums since approximately 1948.

The broader scheme will make more sense after reading the next two sections. Motives behind the Cooperative Federalism scheme are simple -- wealth and power.

The Codes Are Unraveled

Part of the problem for researchers and people who have relied on the law fraternity for assistance has been not understanding the United States Code, the Code of Federal Regulations, and corresponding Codes for the several States. As a consequence, otherwise excellent researchers, and the few attorneys who are loyal Americans interested in correcting the current prosecution and seizure frenzy, have been led like a dog chasing his tail. However, keys to unraveling both the United States Code and the Code of Federal Regulations, as well as State codes, have been unearthed.

At the onset, an important fact needs to be established: The United States Code and State codes are not laws of the United States and the several States. These codes are merely classification systems; in and of itself, the United States Code does not vest a franchise of authority in any officer, department or agency of the United States, and does not create a liability or benefit for anybody. The same is true for State codes. Laws of the United States are published annually in the Statutes at Large; laws enacted by State legislatures are published in State session laws following each session of the legislature. So far as the United States Code is concerned, even those titles enacted as so-called "positive law" are merely "legal evidence" of laws of the United States; those titles which have not been enacted as positive law are "prima facie" (by appearance) the law.{14}

The United States Code was first published in 1926. It has never been more than a classification system for laws of the United States. The first edition was based on the Revised Statutes of 1878, and session laws, published in the Statutes at Large, through 1925. Each year there is a supplement to the Code with laws passed in the immediate previous session, then every six or so years, a new edition incorporates original legislation, amendments, and repeals enacted since the previous edition was published. Supplements are then added each year until the next new edition is published. The 1994 edition, with supplements, is the sixth and current edition.

The purpose of the United States Code, and its nature, were stated clearly in the Preface to the 1926 edition, the first paragraph reproduced here:

The fact that the United States Code isn't law is demonstrated by § 33 of the Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 991, the act which purportedly enacted title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, into positive law:

What is legislative construction? Legislative construction determines application, in some way identifies source of authority, etc. Any given section in the United States Code is separated from its title, enacting clause, and other essentials necessary to determine application. It is evidence of law, but it is not the law.

The first three editions of the Code were reasonably straightforward (1926, 1934 & 1940), then in 1948 and after, an amalgamation process began which converges and distorts sections from various titles in the 1940 edition. The current 28 U.S.C. § 132, addressed in an earlier footnote, merges sections of the 1940 edition from titles 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, and 48, Territories and Insular Possessions. The section is an amalgamation of two or more sections from previous editions of the United States Code and Acts of Congress, with the consequence being that people cannot simply read it and determine what portion has what application. The underlying laws were not amended, merely the amalgamated section in the Code. Therefore, sections of the Code are not law of the United States, as such. They are merely evidence that a law or several laws of that nature exist somewhere in the Statutes at Large.

Fortunately, there is a reasonably simple way to unravel the United States Code to demonstrate proper application of any given section: Following each section, there are Historical and Statutory Notes. These notes provide the history, and cites in the Statutes at Large where the original act and major amendments are located. By going to the original act citation in the Statutes at Large, the beginning cite can be secured, then that cite and/or the popular name of any given piece of legislation can be found in the Distribution Tables in the United States Code. The Distribution Tables provide a section-by-section breakdown of the bill published in the Statutes at Large, directing to where pieces of the legislation are located in the United States Code.

For example, taxing authority for Subtitle A and administrative and judicial sections in Subtitle F of Title 26, the Internal Revenue Code, are major sources of grief for people across the country. Subtitle A contains particulars relating to what most Americans know as the "income tax" -- technically, the "normal tax," enacted as a privilege tax against officers, employees and agents of United States Government in 1919. Today elements of the normal tax and Social Security-related legislation are scattered through titles 5, 26, 31, 42, and possibly other titles. Generally speaking, judicial procedure for collection of this tax, when it is delinquent, is in the Fair Debt Collection Act, not in Subtitle F of the Internal Revenue Code (see 5 U.S.C. § 5512). The General Accounting Office, as general agent for the Treasury of the United States, is responsible for initiation of judicial proceedings, not the Internal Revenue Service.{15} This is but one example of the mire created by the entire United States Code, not just the Internal Revenue Code, and has been disabling for those who make sincere efforts to unravel laws of the United States. When proper use of the Code is understood, it is a handy tool, but it is not law of the United States -- it is merely evidence of law. Because of classification, merging and editing distortions, it is no longer even reliable evidence except for those willing to wade through volumes of legalese.

The Code of Federal Regulations has a corresponding finding aid called the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, authorized by the Federal Register Act at 44 U.S.C. § 1510.{16} The Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, along with other finding aids, is located in the Index volume of the Code of Federal Regulations. The Code of Federal Regulations bears approximately the relationship to the Federal Register as the United States Code does to the Statutes at Large, with finding aids in the Index providing the bridge between statutes and regulations (see 44 U.S.C. § 1507).

The Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules lists sections and titles of the United States Code in numerical order, with sections that have published regulations listed having general application or application limited to the regulation listed, and those not listed having limited application to (1) government of the United States (see 5 U.S.C. § 301), (2) territories and insular possessions of the United States, and/or (3) admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States.

In this scheme, any statute promulgated by Congress must be wed to an administrative regulation before it has the force and effect of law.{17} Via a statute promulgated by Congress in compliance with Article I § 7 of the Constitution, Congress effectively says, "This is the law," then the President or an executive officer by regulation says, "This is the application and the way the statute will be enforced." One is incomplete without the other; until a legitimate statute and general application regulation are joined, there can be no general application save as is applicable to the three limited and special jurisdictions listed above.

Another secret --the Director of the Administrative Office of Courts of the United States is responsible for publishing regulations governing conduct and operation of court officers and personnel such as clerks, probation officers and the like (see 28 U.S.C. §§ 603(a)(1) & 603(f)). It does not appear that these regulations are published in the Code of Federal Regulations, but must be secured from that office. Additionally, the Director produces a manual for conduct of United States magistrate judges. This is important to know as the courts themselves, through clerks as well as judges and other officers attached to the courts, are keepers at the gate. Having regulations in hand is vital to forcing compliance or filing complaints for removal and/or prosecution.{18}

Nearly all States joined to the Cooperative Federalism scheme have adopted the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act which sets out regulatory requirements similar to those in the Federal Administrative Procedures Act and the Federal Register Act. Comparable finding aids and indexes should be in place. State law for the several States respectively is in State session laws, not codes such as the Oklahoma Statutes Annotated.

Basic & Essential Authorities

While every effort is being made to write this material so virtually any literate person can understand it, it is necessarily steeped in legal cites, court decisions, etc, which can make comprehension difficult for those not familiar with principles of law and the strange language sometimes described as legalese. This is probably the most difficult section as it deals with five essential authorities, then works through the relationship of the authorities by using examples. In order to provide orientation, the authorities are listed immediately below, ahead of the actual section narrative. The narrative begins immediately following the itemized list.

A physical scientist will say, "Nothing comes from nothing." The same rule applies to governments, particularly governments established by constitutions where departments and officers have specifically enumerated powers. This is absolutely the case when it comes to governments of the United States and the Union of several States party to the Constitution. Each has its constitutionally-enumerated powers, and can do nothing which is not delegated by applicable constitutions. Sovereignty, as such, is vested and resides in the people; the people divest themselves of whatever responsibilities they want governments to tend to by way of powers enumerated in applicable constitutions.

Through the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States (first Ten Articles of Amendment), and bills of rights in constitutions of the several States party to the Constitution, the American people specifically retained certain rights which were articulated in the Declaration of Independence (1776), and in the English-American heritage as early as the Magna Charta (1215). The rights to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, articulated in the Declaration of Independence, restated as rights to life, liberty and property in the Fifth Article of Amendment, were and are considered essential to freedom and prosperity. These three unalienable and therefore inseparable rights, which are what American founders considered self-evident truth, are like the legs on a three-legged milking stool.

The Tenth Article of Amendment is particularly important as it prohibits government of the United States from exercising power which is not specifically delegated to it by and enumerated in the Constitution. When properly understood, the Tenth Amendment works somewhat like a volley ball or tennis net, separating State and Federal authority. This frames what is called the Separation of Powers Doctrine -- State and Federal governments are postured as the antipodes or opposite ends of authority, with one operating inside the scope of its enumerated powers while the other operates in the scope of its enumerated and limited powers. Additionally, the Separation of Powers Doctrine distinguishes responsibility of the three branches of government -- executive and judicial branches do not have constitutional legislative authority, legislative and administrative branches do not exercise judicial authority, and legislative and judicial branches do not administer laws of the United States. Each branch has its role, and with few limited crossover areas that are gray in nature, one does not perform the functions of the other.

This principle is expressly articulated in Springer et al v. Government of the Philippines Islands, 48 S.Ct. 480, 277 U.S. 189, 72 L.Ed. 485 (1928), at 201 & 202:

Original authority is vested in the three branches of Federal government respectively by the Constitution of the United States. One cannot exercise constitutionally enumerated powers of another; none can exercise power not delegated by the Constitution. The Constitution simultaneously serves as an empowering instrument while articulating limitation in the "Thou shalt not..," language of the Tenth Article of Amendment.

The first essential authority where matters at hand are concerned, beyond the constitutionally-enumerated power, is statutory authority. The Constitution itself merely established the branches and authorizes authority each may exercise. At Article I § 8.18, the Constitution specifies that, "[The Congress shall have Power] To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." The means for enacting laws is prescribed in Article I § 7.

Through this law-making authority, Congress may activate and enact all, some or none of any given power enumerated in the Constitution. This includes creating offices and/or agencies. For example, the Attorney General has been an officer in the administration almost from the time Congress first convened under the Constitution in 1789 (Act of Sept. 24, 1789). The Department of Justice wasn't legislated into existence until 1870 (Act of June 22, 1870). Since then, Congress has vested certain responsibilities in the Attorney General and/or the Department of Justice, or sometimes in departments Congress has created in the Department of Justice. By way of delegation of authority by the Attorney General, these various divisions of the Department of Justice, and departments or agencies attached to the Department of Justice, are charged with carrying out responsibilities prescribed by statute.

One of the more important statutory restrictions which secures and reinforces Congress' authority is at 4 U.S.C. §§ 71 & 72. The first of these sections establishes territory within the current borders of the District of Columbia as the seat of government for the United States; the second prohibits any government department from operating outside the District of Columbia save as Congress authorizes by statute.

In this context, we can see what should be lawful constraint on the Federal Bureau of Investigation by examining origins and statutory authority of the FBI: Read notes following 28 U.S.C. § 531 to find that Congress didn't create the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI simply appeared in the Department of Justice -- it is an administratively-created entity, so cannot exceed authority originally vested in the Attorney General or the Department of Justice. Statutory authority vested in the FBI and the Attorney General is found at 28 U.S.C. § 535:

Administrative creation of the FBI is confirmed in The United States Government Manual, 1996/97 edition, page 349: "The Federal Bureau of Investigation was established in 1908 by the Attorney General, who directed that Department of Justice investigations be handled by its own staff..."

What authority does the FBI have to investigate and otherwise bother people in the several States other than Government officers and employees? De facto authority -- "I can, therefore I will." The FBI has no statutory authority to disturb anyone in the Union of several States other than government officers and employees. Therefore, 4 U.S.C. § 72, in addition to constitutional limitations, constrains FBI investigations in the Union of several States to subject matter prescribed by statute, that being 28 U.S.C. § 535, cited above.

The Internal Revenue Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms are successors of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico, the BIR to IRS name change being effected by T.D.O. 150-29, in 1953; BATF was split from IRS in 1972 by administrative order, not by Congress' statutory authority. No new governmental entity was created. These agencies, which are not part of the Department of the Treasury of the United States or the Treasury of the United States, have legitimate authority only in insular possessions and territorial waters belonging to the United States, all of which are subject to Congress' plenary power under Article IV § 3.2 of the Constitution. Neither has statutory authority beyond borders of the District of Columbia save in insular possessions of the United States, per 4 U.S.C. § 72.

The same statute condemns United States District Courts situated in the Union of several States, and the "United States of America" -- civil and criminal process in the Union of several States must issue in Article III district courts of the United States in the name and by authority of the United States (judicial authority over criminal actions in district courts of the United States at 18 U.S.C. § 3231 & civil actions relating to tax cases at 26 U.S.C. § 7402, cited earlier).

Another example of necessary statutory authority is rules of procedure for judicial process. By way of judiciary acts of 1789 and 1792, district courts of the United States were established as common law courts. Cases and controversies "arising under" the Constitution and laws of the United States (Article III § 2.1 "arising under" clause), and treaties enacted by authority of the United States, are to proceed in the course of the common law as established in England at the time the Constitution was implemented.{19}

Current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Supreme Court Rules, and Federal Rules of Evidence are promulgated under statutory authority evidenced at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074, particularly § 2072, and are applicable only in legitimate United States district courts, not in district courts of the United States.

This is one of the major deception moves made in 1948. In the 1920s, then again in the 1930s, Congress authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe rules for equity, admiralty and maritime cases for Article III district courts of the United States. In fact, the 1934 edition of the United States Code appears confused on the matter as "one form of action" was already in statutory language, but rules of evidence and other statutory matters relating to the course of the common law had not been repealed. Revision and historical notes, which have been the responsibility of West Publishing from the beginning, articulated the confusion -- probably the editor was being dumb like a fox. Most consternation appeared to be straightened out by the 1940 edition, then in 1948, statutory authority for the rules, and the rules themselves, were amended to apply in United States district courts rather than district courts of the United States.{20} Equity, admiralty, and maritime cases proceed in the course of the civil law; cases at law proceed in the course of the common law. There is no presumption in the common law. When some matter of authority or liability is challenged, proof must be provided in an open hearing and be established by documentary evidence and testimony.

The course of the civil law operates to a great extent on presumption, even though there is no Federal Rules of Evidence rule for presumption relating to criminal cases (see notes for Rule 301, presumption in civil matters, Federal Rules of Evidence). In the course of the civil law, which presumes, "The will of the prince is law," presumption, including undisclosed presumption, may lie against the defendant, leaving the defendant to prove innocence rather than requiring the plaintiff to prove guilt or liability. Each of the several States party to the Constitution save Louisiana is a common law State; as a longtime French colony prior to United States acquisition in 1803, Louisiana was permitted to retain the Napoleonic Code, which was civil law. Read Downes v. Bidwell, 1901, cited elsewhere in this document, for the history of how the Ordinance of 1787 for government of the Northwest Territory was extended to each new territory, assuring due process in the course of the common law, prior to the cession treaty ceding the Philippines, Puerto Rico, etc., following the Spanish-American War. The Ordinance of 1787 is part of the organic law of the United States, published in the first volume of the current United States Code.

Difference between due process in the course of the common law and due process in the course of the civil law is significant, and so long as the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Articles of Amendment are in place, Congress has no authority to bastardize the clear and straightforward rules of common law process. There is, in fact, no statutory authority for merger of rules governing process for actions at law with actions in equity, admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction.

Next is the statute being executed and prosecuted: What is its source of authority and application for any given statute, which may be 'evidenced' by a section of the United States Code?

Questions framed in Wayman v. Southard, cited earlier, with the decision written by Chief Justice John Marshall, provide an important lesson. The first question was basically, "What does the Constitution authorize Congress to do?" relative to courts, process, etc. The second was, "What has Congress done?"

Too many involved in litigation jump the gun by arguing what the Constitution authorizes Congress to do, without stepping back to examine and question what Congress has done. Since the 1920s, what the Constitution authorizes Congress to do under Article I enumerated powers has been all but irrelevant as nearly all statutory enactments since have issued under Article IV authority in territory of the United States -- precious few laws of the United States now apply to the Union of several States party to the Constitution. Arguing about authority under the commerce clause and other broadly construed powers is a waste of time as Congress abandoned regulating commerce among the several States in favor of regulating commerce among territories and insular possessions of the United States, and foreign commerce, long ago. Another example, by way of the revenue act of November 23, 1921, Congress repealed virtually all excise taxes and other taxes applicable under Article I and Sixteenth Article of Amendment authority, the "normal" tax against officers and employees of the government of the United States promulgated in 1919 being one of the few exceptions. When the various taxes were reenacted at a later date, they were applicable in the District of Columbia and territories and insular possessions of the United States, or as might apply in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States.

It appears that governments of the several States are working through corporate structures, and via municipal corporations, are "acting" as though each is an instrumentality or political subdivision of the United States. However, at Article IV § 3.1, the Constitution condemns this:

Once Congress admits a new State to the Union, nobody, including Congress, has authority to create another State within jurisdiction of the existing State. Therefore, the so-called corporate State, which acts as an instrumentality of the United States, exists and operates as a completely de facto entity. It has no lawful existence or authority. Governors and legislatures of the several States certainly don't have authority to create new states.

One of the grand paradoxes set up by this move to Article IV plenary power, as opposed to Article I delegated powers, is framed in the statute which grants the Supreme Court power to promulgate rules of procedure, at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b):

The Separation of Powers Doctrine comes into the picture here: Congress does not have authority to delegate legislative powers to administrative and judicial branches of government. Yet with 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), Congress gave the Supreme Court legislative repeal power. Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court repeal any conflicting statute. Justices Black and Douglas argued this well into the 1960's, but to no avail.

There is, however, a reasonably simple explanation for how Congress could delegate legislative authority: Congress delegated these powers to the Supreme Court under the Article IV territorial clause, not as pertains to the Union of several States party to the Constitution. This is demonstrated in Rule 54(c) application of terms, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:

Applications above use territorial possessions of the United States as examples. None of the examples represent the Union of several States. A statute must be interpreted within the framework of its language, and if all examples are of one class, application cannot go beyond the class. Similarly, if the wording on a can of flea spray lists only breeds of dogs, the flea killer is designed for dogs, but not cats. If the intent of Congress is manifest in the plain wording of statutes, as evidenced at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), the enactment must be taken at face value. Consequently, what the Supreme Court sets out in rules is the determining factor as statutes contrary to the rules are repealed by authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Since Congress may not delegate legislative authority in the framework of general powers enumerated in Article I of the Constitution, authority for rules promulgated by the Supreme Court to repeal any and all conflicting law must be exercise of Congress' Article IV legislative power over territory and other possessions of the United States. This is the only way to reconcile implications of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) with the Separation of Powers Doctrine. In fact, by referencing the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, which is addressed elsewhere in this document, it is found that the section is not listed, thereby indicating that there are no general application regulations save as might be promulgated by the Director of the Administrative Office of United States Courts.

Dan Meador presents this material on video tape you can buy it online.

Check out our other Public Awareness books, pamphlets and tapes.

The acid test is to examine application. To do that, consider authority for the Attorney General to imprison people, set out at 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a):

Since the Supreme Court has stipulated that an Act of Congress is locally applicable in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, or in a territory or an insular possession, the term "Act of Congress" used in 18 U.S.C. § 4001 must comply with the application the Supreme Court prescribed in Rule 54(c), F.R.Crim.P., or it is repealed by 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Therefore, current authority for the Attorney General to imprison people is applicable only in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, a territory or insular possession of the United States. Since the Separation of Powers Doctrine prohibits one branch of government from performing constitutionally delegated powers of another, thereby prohibiting the Supreme Court from enacting or repealing legislation, the repeal power of rules authorized at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) must be delegated to the Supreme Court under Congress' Article IV plenary power in territory and other possessions of the United States. Application of the term "Act of Congress" in Rule 54(c), F.R.Crim.P., and use of the term in 18 U.S.C. § 4001, are consistent with that conclusion. The further inescapable conclusion is that title 18 of the United States Code, the criminal code, is evidence of law applicable only in territories and possessions of the United States.

By consulting the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, it is found that 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074 are not listed. Therefore, there are no general application regulations published in the Federal Register. This authority check corresponds with and supports the conclusion above.

The next matter of authority is delegation of authority. By statute, Congress vests basic authority over any given title and various administrative functions in the President, an executive officer such as the Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury, or in departments of the United States. Where authority is vested in the President, he may redelegate it to executive officers, departments, etc., via Executive Order, the E.O. required to be published in the Federal Register in compliance with the Federal Register Act (44 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq., particularly § 1505(a)). Specific statutory authority for Presidential Executive Orders is at 3 U.S.C. § 301. Where authority is delegated from the President to an executive officer, or is vested in an executive officer by statute, the executive officer must redelegate authority down line by way of delegation orders published in the Federal Register in compliance with the Federal Register Act (44 U.S.C. § 1505(a)). The Federal Register serves as public notice.

It is convenient that nearly all Attorney General delegation orders are reproduced in Part 0 of title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations (28 CFR, Part 0). Reading this rather lengthy part provides an excellent outline of authority vested in the Department of Justice, the office of the United States Attorney, the Bureau of Prisons, etc. However, the regulations can be misleading without knowing other particulars so they shouldn't be taken at what appears to be face value without considerable study. For example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons is a corporation, it is no more a government department than the Federal Reserve System is, and no more a part of the Department of Justice than the Internal Revenue Service is part of the Department of the Treasury of the United States.

On the other hand, there are certain striking disclosures in Attorney General delegations of authority that don't require special knowledge, nor the aptitude of a rocket scientist. For example, the Attorney General delegation order at 28 CFR, Part 0.55 vests powers in the Assistant Attorney General over the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice relative to those accused or convicted of crimes against the United States. Then the delegation order reproduced at 28 CFR, Part 0.64-1 authorizes the Assistant Attorney General over the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice to act as "Central Authority" or "Competent Authority" under treaties authorized by Public Law 95-144 on behalf of the United States of America. Further authority relating to the United States of America is delegated at 28 CFR, Part 0.64-2.

The picture takes even better shape via the Director of the Bureau of Prisons: The delegation order at 28 CFR, Part 0.96 authorizes the Director to take custody of people accused or convicted of offenses against the United States; the delegation order at 28 CFR, Part 0.96b authorizes the Director to take custody of offenders from the United States of America under provisions specified in a treaty authorized by Public Law 95-144. The Director acts as agent of the United States in this transfer process. Under terms of Public Law 95-144, whoever is transferred from United States of America to United States custody must sign consent prior to transfer. Obviously, whenever the Assistant Attorney General over the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or their respective delegates, including United States Attorneys, wardens, U.S. Marshals, etc., act against someone prosecuted in the name and by authority of the "United States of America" beyond provisions of Pub.L. 95-144 where there is no treaty in place, the victim has not been properly extradited from his or her home asylum State, and has not signed consent to be transferred from United States of America to United States custody, those responsible are respectively acting as de facto agents of a government foreign to the United States. Since they frequently proceed under actual or threatened force of arms, they engage in treason, as defined in Article III § 3 of the Constitution.

They are reasonably short so the first paragraph of the Director of the Bureau of prisons delegation of authority at 28 CFR, Part 0.96, and the entire delegation of authority at 28 CFR, Part 0.96b are reproduced below:

The term "State" used in 28 CFR, Part 0.96b must conform to application of the term "State" prescribed in Rule 54(c), F.R.Crim.P., per authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), so these regulations are applicable to the Federal States (Puerto Rico, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Virgin Islands, and American Samoa), and are exclusive of the Union of several States party to the Constitution.

Use of the two terms "United States" and "United States of America" in the same regulation clearly distinguishes one from the other. This new "United States of America" is territorial; as agent of the United States, the Director is authorized to transfer offenders to and from the United States of America to United States custody, United States of America jurisdiction is foreign to United States jurisdiction, and this United States of America evidently has authority to effect treaties under Public Law 95-144, so is political in nature. It is a power foreign to the Constitution of the United States and the Union of several States party to the Constitution that has no constitutional standing or authority in the several States whatever. If there was no other evidence, Attorney General delegation orders at 28 CFR, Parts 0.55, 0.64-1, 0.64-2, 0.96 & 0.96b conclusively prove conclusions of this paragraph.

The Internal Revenue Code provides another interesting trail to follow: 26 U.S.C. § 7621 authorizes the President to establish revenue districts. Under authority of 3 U.S.C. § 301, the President may redelegate authority vested in him by statute to executive officers via Executive Order, the E.O. required to be published in the Federal Register in compliance with the Federal Register Act (44 U.S.C. § 1505(a)).

The search for the President's redelegation of authority would seem to be a blind trail as 26 U.S.C. § 7621 does not appear in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules. Therefore, there is no general application regulation applicable to the Union of several States party to the Constitution and the population at large. However, the President did delegate this responsibility to the Secretary of the Treasury via E.O. #10289. E.O. #10289 is published in the United States Code following 3 U.S.C. § 301; the applicable portion pertains to customs laws and the Anti-Smuggling Act. By going back to the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules to the section on Executive Orders, it is found that application of the authority in E.O. #10289 is 19 CFR, Part 101. There are no regulations pertaining to revenue districts in title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which would apply to income tax, normal tax, Social Security tax, and other taxes in Subtitles A, B & C of the Internal Revenue Code.

The easy way to determine what 19 CFR, Part 101 pertains to is to turn to the "List of CFR Titles, Chapters, Subchapters, and Parts", another convenient finding aid in the Index volume of the Code of Federal Regulations. This compilation immediately follows the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules.

Not surprisingly, title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations covers Customs Duties, and Chapter I conveys authority to the "United States Customs Service, Department of the Treasury (Parts 1-199)". 26 CFR, Part 101 is the regulation styled "General provisions." By going to the actual regulations in the volume that contains the regulation at 19 CFR, Part 101, it is found that this is the authority to establish customs districts, and since the authority is vested in the United States Customs Service rather than the Internal Revenue Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, etc., one might be curious enough to write to the District Director of the Internal Revenue Service Arkansas-Oklahoma District, or some other district in one of the several States party to the Constitution, to see precisely what lawful authority he has for maintaining an internal revenue district in the Union of several States. Certainly it isn't 26 U.S.C. § 7621, E.O. #10289, or 19 CFR, Part 101 -- that authority is vested exclusively in the United States Customs Service. Unless an IRS or BATF district director, or the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, has a rabbit hidden in a hat, these agencies, both successors of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico, are exercising de facto authority -- authority in fact, but not in law. They are in defiance of the prohibition at 4 U.S.C. § 72, as well as sundry constitutional limitations.

It so happens that there is another authority: In 1956, via Treasury Delegation Order #150-42, the Secretary of the Treasury delegated authority to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the areas of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Canal Zone, etc. Simultaneously, authority over these areas was removed from district and regional customs offices in Florida, Georgia, and New York. The delegation order was slightly amended in 1986 by T.D.O. #150-01. The 1986 order eliminated specific mention of the Canal Zone, which is no longer subject to Congress' Article IV § 3.2 plenary power, and extended authority of the Commissioner to other areas of the world subject to jurisdiction of the United States. The Northern Mariana Islands have been added to the flock of insular possessions since 1956, Guam and American Samoa were brought under internal revenue laws of the United States since 1960, etc.

Finally, any given statute which creates an obligation, prescribes a penalty, etc., must have an implementing regulation. This is required by the Federal Register Act, the applicable section at 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a), the same subsection that establishes the mandate for delegations of authority to be published in the Federal Register.

Here we can do what amounts to a frontal attack: Title 18 of the Code of Federal Regulations is "Conservation of Power and Water Resources". There is no title in the Code of Federal Regulations for the Criminal Code, which is Title 18 of the United States Code. Each title 18 U.S.C. criminal statute listed in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, and most aren't, relies on regulations promulgated under authority of some other title.

In order to see application for alleged crimes against the "United States of America" (United States?), alleged offenses of nineteen people incarcerated at the Federal Medical Center-Lexington at Lexington, Kentucky were listed in order by U.S.C. title and section number, then checked against the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules. Very few of the alleged crimes appear in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, and the few that do appear have regulations promulgated under authority of titles 19, 26 & 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Title 19 is Customs Duties, under jurisdiction of the United States Customs Service; title 26 is Internal Revenue, under jurisdiction of the Internal Revenue Service; and title 27 is Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms, under jurisdiction of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Customs, IRS, and BATF are listed as agencies of the Department of the Treasury. However, by consulting title 31 of the United States Code, it is found that they are not agencies in the Department of the Treasury of the United States. IRS, BATF, and very possibly the current United States Customs Service, which is successor of the original customs service established by Congress in the 1890s, are successors of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico; IRS and BATF are agencies of the Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico, not the Department of the Treasury of the United States. This is generally confirmed by definitions in title 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations, aside from other evidence (see definitions in 27 CFR, Part 250.11).

We have already disproved authority of IRS & BATF, by way of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, for establishing revenue districts in the Union of several States under authority of 26 U.S.C. § 7621, so that is adequate for the time. Only the United States Customs Service, under regulations in title 19 of the United States Code, has authority to establish customs districts in the Union of several States. Therefore, it is unnecessary to provide concrete proof of origins of IRS and BATF -- they do not have authority under 26 U.S.C. § 7621 to establish revenue districts in the Union of several States party to the Constitution. Their jurisdiction lies in insular possessions and territorial waters of the United States, the delegation of authority being T.D.O. #150-42 (1956), as amended by T.D.O. #150-01 (1986). Consequently, regulations 26 CFR, Parts 1-799 and 27 CFR, Parts 1-299 are applicable in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, and possibly the District of Columbia.

To further solidify where IRS & BATF have jurisdiction, and to establish where taxes in the Internal Revenue Code apply when there is geographical application, Consider definitions of the terms "United States", "State", and "Citizen" at 26 CFR § 31.3121(e)-1. These definitions apply to Social Security, unemployment tax, etc., with the original enactment in 1935. These definitions are possibly the clearest relating to administration of the Internal Revenue Code, and are particularly important as they demonstrate application to Alaska and Hawaii before 1960 but not after, and application to Guam and American Samoa after January 1, 1961:

The allegation that most Federal laws presently on the books are applicable only in territory belonging to the United States might seem far-fetched even with proofs already established in this discourse, but consider the definitions at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(2), which are applicable for Chapter 44 -- Firearms, in the current edition of the United States Code (18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930).

Application of the term "State" above is exclusive of the Union of several States party to the Constitution -- all examples of the class are territories and possessions of the United States subject to Congress' Article IV § 3.2 legislative jurisdiction.

This conclusion is supported by the Constitution: The Second Article of Amendment secures the right to own and bear arms for the sovereign people of the several States party to the Constitution. The Fifth Article of Amendment also secures the absolute right of the people to life, liberty, and property except when taken in lawful courts by due process of law in the course of the common law. An absolute right includes the right to defend that which falls within the right -- life, liberty and property. And since there is no constitutional amendment which alters or limits the Second and Fifth Articles of Amendment, or lists firearms and related commodities as commodities Congress may regulate, it follows that the bevy of firearms laws in Chapter 44 of title 18 and related laws in title 26 of the United States Code were promulgated under Congress' Article IV § 3.2 plenary power in territory belonging to the United States. The cumulative evidence is sufficient to leave even the worst cynic with nothing more than shifting sand beneath his feet. Congress may tax something, but has no regulatory power unless the power is specifically enumerated.

Another politically sensitive subject needs to be addressed. We will come at it through example: The Eighteenth Article of Amendment was ratified in 1919. It implemented national prohibition against intoxicating distilled spirits, with Section 2 establishing concurrent State and Federal enforcement authority. Ratification of the Twenty-first Article of Amendment in 1933 repealed the Eighteenth, thereby ending national prohibition, effecting what is described as State's choice, and terminating concurrent State and Federal enforcement authority -- enforcement of State liquor laws lies beyond Federal enforcement authority. This matter was determined by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1935.

Given this example, it stands to reason that it would require a constitutional amendment to implement national prohibition against any other commodity, whether arms, drugs, or anything else. There is no such amendment authorizing prohibition against arms, drugs or any other commodity. Congress may have Article I and/or Sixteenth Article of Amendment taxing authority relative to these things, but has no authority to institute prohibition or otherwise limit sale and distribution. The Constitution does not confer regulatory authority. Therefore, assumed authority, which amounts to usurpation of power, has simply been used as an excuse and means to field what amounts to a private army that daily subjects people throughout the nation, and elsewhere around the world, to "nonconstitutional", de facto rule.

Prohibition against alcohol was the greatest boon ever for organized crime. When government imposes prohibition against anything, it creates black market demand. Continuing demand for distilled spirits created the environment in which Al Capone and other organized crime figures could put financial legs under national and international operations capable of challenging and doing open battle with government enforcement agencies. Crime organizations and government enforcement agencies grew at unprecedented rates during prohibition years. The same has been true for drug prohibition imposed without constitutional authority: Drug cartels grew up on inflated revenue generated from consumer demand -- an estimated 35 million Americans use what are classified as illegal drugs. Presently 60% of the people incarcerated by the Bureau of Prisons were convicted on drug-related charges, and depending on the State, 30 to 40% of the people in State prisons are incarcerated for drug-related offenses. The underground market continues to flourish, drug cartels and independents continue to prosper, and the American people are saddled with outrageous costs for enforcement, prosecution, incarceration, etc., when in reality, there are no Federal or State drug laws applicable in the Union of several States party to the Constitution.

Drug laws are predicated on revenue laws -- customs duties. They originated in commercial trade treaties in the early part of the Twentieth Century, particularly after the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Congress promulgated the China Trade Act in 1904, which regulated trade in opium, cocaine, and citric wines, then step-by-step moved by illusion into efforts to regulate sale and distribution of these commodities. The Labeling Act of 1906 appears to be the first significant domestic step, then the Anti-Narcotic Act of 1914, as amended, was used as the vehicle for perpetrating the illusion of legitimate prohibition against these commodities in the environment of national alcohol prohibition.

Leaving that subject, we will consult the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules for regulations pertaining to firearms laws in title 18 of the United States Code (18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930). Of necessity, tracking these authorities gets pretty bogged down in "legalese", so forgive complicated sentence structure and what amount to lists of authorities: Regulations for 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 are at 27 CFR, Part 178; an additional regulation for 18 U.S.C. § 921 (definition) is at 27 CFR, Part 72; and an additional regulation for 18 U.S.C. § 926 (rules and regulations), is at 27 CFR, Part 200.

The general application regulation for 18 U.S.C. § 921-930 is 27 CFR, Part 178, located in Subchapter M -- Alcohol, Tobacco and Other Excise Taxes, Part 178 pertaining to commerce in firearms and ammunition. Part 72 is in Subchapter F -- Procedures and Practices, and relates to disposition of seized personal property; Part 200 is in Subchapter M -- Alcohol, Tobacco and Other Excise Taxes, and pertains to rules of practice in permit proceedings. The definition of "State" at 18 U.S.C. § 921 narrows the geographical application to territories and other possessions of the United States, as does the lack of IRS/BATF authority to establish revenue districts under authority of 26 U.S.C. § 7621, and the fact that these are excise taxes rather than import duties further verifies application is in insular possessions of the United States and the District of Columbia, exclusive of the Union of several States party to the Constitution. There is no constitutional provision whatever vesting Congress with authority to regulate production, distribution and sale of firearms and ammunition within the Union of several States party to the Constitution. Under Article I authority, Congress could legitimately impose an excise tax on production and distribution of firearms, but the legislation would have to be for taxing purposes only, not regulation of who can or cannot purchase firearms and ammunition.

At this juncture it would be useful to reiterate that in June 1921, Congress effectively hid the Treasury of the United States by creating the General Accounting Office, under direction of the Comptroller General, then moved Treasury employees to GAO. GAO is an independent agency or department, and serves as general agent of the Treasury of the United States, in charge of determining legitimacy of all claims of or against the United States. A claim against the United States cannot be adjudicated in courts of the United States unless it has first been submitted to, and rejected by GAO. This is the reason so many cases against the Internal Revenue Service, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, IRS revenue agents, the "United States", etc., are dismissed as setting forth a claim on which relief cannot be granted -- whoever initiates these cases doesn't know the claim must first be submitted to GAO.{21}

The Department of the Treasury is an administrative agency, it is not the Treasury of the United States -- the Treasury of the United States, established while Congress was still convened under the Articles of Confederation, predates the Constitution, but was established by Congress under the Constitution via the act of September 2, 1789. It has always been under congressional supervision. The Department of the Treasury of the United States has precious little authority in the Union of several States.

We will conclude this section with rationale behind Cooperative Federalism: Probably the most important legislation in 1913 was the Federal Reserve Act. The nation had two national or central banks in the early going, but the charters of both were terminated and the banks abolished. In 1836, President Andrew Jackson vetoed the bill that would have renewed the charter of the second, his rationale simple and to the point: The Constitution does not delegate authority for Congress to establish a national bank. It still doesn't. Yet in 1913, the Federal Reserve Act created a more ominous entity than a national bank as the Federal Reserve System literally has power to expand or contract the entire economy by regulation of key interest rates and bank reserves. None of these powers are delegated by the Constitution, so creation of the Federal Reserve System had to be under Congress' Article IV § 3.2 plenary power in territory belonging to the United States. With and subsequent to the Federal Reserve Act came fraudulent, nonconstitutional credit and monetary systems.

Once fraudulent credit and monetary systems, and economic controls were in place, the balance of Federal government had to be moved under Congress' Article IV § 3.2 legislative authority in territory belonging to the United States. In this section, we have demonstrated the move by examining five essential authorities. Laws of the United States evidenced in the United States Code nearly all apply (1) to officers and employees of the United States, (2) to territories and insular possessions of the United States, and/or (3) to maritime and admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and do not have general application in the Union of several States party to the Constitution.

Underlying Compromise of the U.S. Marshal

One of the cruelest hoaxes ever has been perpetrated against what are generally capable, loyal Americans now employed in capacities that used to exercise legitimate law enforcement authority of United States government, United States marshals and their deputies. The position of United States marshal was created in 1789; the U.S. Marshal and his deputies had the same powers in the several States as the State or county sheriff, as applicable, when and if there was legitimate United States jurisdiction. However, the United States Marshal, as an independent office, was abolished, with the successor merged into the Department of Justice under direction of the Attorney General, by Public Law 89-554, § 4(c), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 619. This 1966 act was amended by Pub.L. 95-530, § 2, Oct. 27, 1978, 92 Stat. 2028, which related to appointment, term, and residence of United States Marshals, the 1978 act repealed by Pub.L. 100-690, Title VII, § 7608(a)(1), Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4512. Pub. L. 100-690 governs most activity of what is now the United States Marshals Service in the Department of Justice. The United States Marshals Service, except within the narrow range of authority vested in the Department of Justice and/or the Attorney General, no longer has authority under laws of the United States as they might apply to the Union of several States in the framework of Congress' general legislative authority delegated primarily in Article I § 8 of the Constitution. Sections of the United States Code which reflect authority of the U.S. Marshals Service are at 28 U.S.C. §§ 561-569. Space will be dedicated to analysis of these sections, as applicable in the framework of this effort, because the office of United States Marshal was the original civil enforcement authority of the United States, where today the United States Marshals Service has considerably different character and jurisdiction.

Basic authority, and chain of command, for the United States Marshals Service is at 28 U.S.C. § 561, reproduced in relative part below:

The old authority of the United States marshal appears to be conveyed to the United States marshals at 28 U.S.C. § 564, but this is an illusion that is dispelled by examination of underlying authorities:

The term "State" in § 564 is all-important as the reference is to insular possessions of the United States, not to the Union of several States. This conclusion will be demonstrated in due course.

The first check on authority is to consult the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, which begins on page 721 of the Index volume of the Code of Federal Regulations, 1996 edition. If there were implementing regulations for 28 U.S.C. §§ 561-569, they would be on page 768. However, these sections of the United States Code are not listed, so there are no applicable delegations of authority or implementing regulations for any of the sections. However, there are regulations applicable under two of the three Public Laws listed above, the first being Pub. L. 89-544 (1966): On page 818 of the 1996 CFR Index volume, it is found that sections of the 1966 law not repealed by subsequent acts are under the implementing regulation at 32 CFR § 716.

By referencing the List of CFR Titles, Chapters, Subchapters, and Parts, beginning on page 831 of the 1996 Index, it is found that Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations pertains to National Defense, and § 716 is in Chapter VI -- Department of the Navy (Parts 700-799); § 716 is in Subchapter C -- Personnel, and § 716 specifies a "Death gratuity."

Here we can demonstrate how the Code is convoluted as authority of the Attorney General, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is also under Pub. L. 89-544, found at 28 U.S.C. § 535, part of which is reproduced elsewhere in this discourse. It is reproduced in its entirety below:

Obviously, Pub. L. 89-554 has intragovernmental application, it does not apply to the Union of several States and the population at large. This is verified by consulting the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, at page 767 of the 1996 CFR Index volume: 28 U.S.C. § 535 is not listed. Therefore, the only general application for Pub.L. 89-554, whether at 28 U.S.C. §§ 535, 561, or any other section of the United States Code, is limited to 32 CFR § 716. The exception is that heads of departments of United States government may promulgate intradepartmental regulations as pertains to their respective departments under authority of 5 U.S.C. § 301.

Using this authority verification, we will consider authority of the United States Marshals Service for 28 U.S.C. §§ 561-569 under the 1988 act, Pub.L. 100-690, found in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules in the 1996 CFR Index volume at page 822. In order to simplify matters, the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules-cited regulations are listed to the left, then the regulation is described from the List of CFR Titles, Chapters, Subchapters, and Parts to the right. The authority to the right will be in that order: CFR title; subtitle, where applicable; chapter; subchapter, where applicable; and part.

Primary concern of the U.S. Marshals Service is governmentwide debarment and suspension, and governmentwide requirements for a drug-free workplace, as applicable. There is very little more of significance that can be applicable to the Union of several States party to the Constitution, and the general population. However, the U.S. Marshals Service has essentially the same authority as a state civil enforcement agency in the District of Columbia and insular possessions of the United States. This is generally the case for Federal civil enforcement agencies, including the FBI, DEA, IRS, BATF, U.S. Customs Service, and in peacetime, the Coast Guard.

The question as to why the office of the U.S. Marshal was convoluted is reasonably easy to demonstrate, as the U.S. Marshals Service deals in "public money", per 28 U.S.C. § 567:

As used in § 567, the term "public money" is a word of art. It doesn't mean what it would appear to mean to the unschooled reader. Public money is predicated on obligations of the United States, not lawful coin of the United States. In other words, under provisions of § 567, the U.S. Marshals Service is one of the key agencies through which private assets outside lawful jurisdiction of the United States, as United States government now operates, are converted as though they belonged to the United States to begin with, which is hardly the case. The convoluted money system is beyond the scope of the present effort, but those who would like to pursue the matter further should read 31 CFR §§ 202-215 as these regulations, the first of which apply to National Banking Associations and other Federal Reserve-member financial institutions qualifying as Federal Tax and Loan Depositaries, have an excellent definitive statement concerning "public money" -- only officers and employees of the United States and United States political subdivisions are entitled to receive "public money". Public money is exclusive of the Federal Reserve Note -- the only law found to date which makes the Federal Reserve Note a lawful "currency" is the Uniform Commercial Code, "adopted" by legislatures of each of the several States by the time Pub. L. 89-554 was promulgated in 1966. By the early 1970s, the Federal Reserve Note was not acceptable for payment of taxes legitimately due the United States.The 31 CFR regulations cited above also provide reasonably complete listings of people subject to State and Federal "income" taxes, a/k/a "normal" tax.

The Constitution has never been amended, it still prescribes gold and silver coin as the lawful national currency. The key provisions are as follows: [Art. I § 8.5] "[The Congress shall have Power] To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin [and, at § 8.6] To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States..," then at § 10.1, the door is closed by the following: "No State shall ... make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts..."

Therein is the crux of the matter: Congress may do as Congress pleases, within the framework of international law, with respect to admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, territories and insular possessions of the United States deemed as territory or otherwise subject to sovereignty of the United States under Article IV § 3.2, and with rules and regulations pertaining to government of the United States. (see 5 U.S.C. § 301 pertaining to regulations for government departments; authority for presidential executive orders at 3 U.S.C. § 301; and the Federal Register Act, at 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq., for publishing requirements and exemptions; 44 U.S.C. § 1510 as authority for the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, the CFR listing, etc.)

For a reality check, we'll examine powers and duties of U.S. Marshals who are now part of the U.S. Marshals Service rather than serving in their respective independent offices:

Compare authority of the U.S. Marshals Service to authority for appointing probation officers, at 18 U.S.C. § 3602:

The chief responsibility of the United States Marshals Service is to attend orders of United States District Courts; the probation officer is appointed by [the judge or judges of] a district court of the United States. One does not have the same "venue" (territorial jurisdiction) as the other save as might be applicable to elected and appointed officers and employees of the United States. The United States Marshals Service, as opposed to the independent office of the United States Marshal prior to 1966, is basically territorial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. Where what amount to regulations determining conduct and powers of the U.S. Marshal are now promulgated by the Director of the United States Marshals Service, regulations governing conduct of the probation officer are promulgated by the Director of the Administrative office of the United States Courts. Regulations governing conduct of both have effectively been hidden, but the fact that the United States Marshals Service carries out orders of United States District Courts rather than district courts of the United States is a determining factor.

Thanks to another researcher and friend, Paul Mitchell, who recently moved from Arizona to Texas, we have a revealing opinion by a United States District Court judge in Eastern Metals Corporation v. Martin, 191 F. Supp. 245 (1960):

To test the ruling, and establish the point at issue, we'll examine § 1332 in relative part:

The good judge in Eastern Metals Corporation v. Martin disclosed that the United States District Court is a legislative court, not an Article III judicial court; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) confirms that this section of Title 28 is applicable exclusively in the District of Columbia and insular possessions subject to sovereignty of the United States by virtue of the territorial clause. The United States District Court is not only a legislative court, it must of necessity be a territorial court. Therefore, while the ruling in Eastern Metals is accurate, it is incomplete by omission. By supplying what is missing from the decision, we are able to demonstrate that the United States Marshals Service now functions primarily in the District of Columbia and insular possessions of the United States. So far as the several States party to the Constitution are concerned, the U.S. Marshals Service operates on the Attorney General's coattails, per 28 U.S.C. § 535, and has authority relating only to officers and employees of United States government.

Per The United States Government Manual, 1996/97 edition, the Director of the United States Marshals Service is or was Eduardo Gonzalez; headquarters of the Service is at 600 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-4210, Phone (202) 307-9065. Intragovernmental regulations governing conduct of the Service have not yet been secured, but are presumed to be those listed above. Anyone wishing to independently secure rules and regulations promulgated by the Director should contact Mr. Gonzalez or his successor.

End Game Alternatives

There is no question that the sovereign people of this nation have been victimized by a silent economic war through most of the twentieth century. In the last four decades, institutionalized aggression has become increasingly bolder. If the de facto system continues unabated, only a small political and financial privileged class will enjoy prosperity and liberty -- not liberty ordinary people seek, but what amounts to license for plunder.

If we look to history's record of Vandals, despots, and tyranny in general, we might be tempted to ask, "What's new?" The answer to that lies in the Declaration of Independence, where American founders justified severance from British rule by the "Laws of Nature, and of Nature's God," and the carefully crafted Constitution of the United States that established the rule of law rather than the capricious nature of man. Constitutional limitations and over eight centuries of English-American common law heritage provide the vehicles and means to peacefully restore constitutional rule.

When Article III courts of the United States were authorized by judiciary acts of 1789 & 1792, they were established as common law courts. Rather than adopt the divergent process that evolved in each of the several States, courts of the United States proceeded in the course of the common law as it was in England at the time, thereby preserving the purer form. Rights secured by the Bill of Rights, the first Ten Articles of Amendment, presumed preservation of what in many cases were ancient writs, and other remedies developed to address usurpation of power.

There are certain maxims of law to be understood. One of considerable import is that he who has no rights has no remedies. Conversely, he who has a right is presumed to have an appropriate remedy. This, then, is the force of the Bill of Rights -- it preserves and thereby prescribes the remedy assumed by the secured right.

In a very real sense, law is a dead letter. Once it is written, it thereafter means what it meant at the time it was written. It does not evolve of its own accord -- it must be amended or replaced before the law itself changes. The Bill of Rights has not been amended or repealed, so the presumed remedies are preserved.

Consider the word "casket". In old and middle English, a casket was a jewel box. Today we bury people in "caskets" -- family and others we have affection for are "precious," so are preserved in a box built to hold and protect precious things. The term "casket" has evolved in meaning so far as contemporary use is concerned, but works of old masters did not evolve with it. If Chaucer used the word "casket", he was talking about a jewel box regardless of what understanding a twentieth century reader might have of the term.

This has been and is one of the great difficulties where coming to grips with law is concerned. Both in rem and in personam are admiralty and maritime actions that proceed in the course of the civil law. The terms aren't generally understood and are frequently misused. Then there is the case of hiding secrets in plain view by use of familiar terms -- United States District Courts and the United States of America are examples. We are deceived and subdued by what we don't know, and by what we look at but don't see. Lack of knowledge and lack of vision have been crippling.

Documenting Cooperative Federalism tyranny is anything but complete. In fact, it has barely begun. But today enough essential foundation stones are in place, and the means for unraveling convoluted codes are known, so competent people can finish the task in reasonably short order. It is a task that must be engaged with deliberate speed.

What remedies are available? Probably the most powerful is public exposure. It is no longer necessary to make constructive and hypothetical arguments. Documentary evidence proves the case against Cooperative Federalism and its perpetrators and patrons.

The First Article of Amendment secures the right to petition for redress of grievance. The right includes judicial as well as political forums. The Fourth preserves an important legal weapon -- the affidavit of criminal complaint. The Fifth, Sixth and Seventh preserve due process in the course of the common law for the aggrieved as well as the defendant. Administrative remedies galore are written into law, with implications of perjury of oath, accessory after the fact, misprision of felony, and misprision of treason when those who owe allegiance to the United States fail to carry out lawful mandates of office. We have barely scratched the surface.

Finally, the Second preserves the right to own and bear arms. It wasn't included in the Bill of Rights so those willing to usurp power for self-serving ends would sleep easy. It is there so the sovereign people have the means to correct public servants who follow in the path of John, Charles, and George III. Each of us has the absolute right to defend life, liberty, and property, and if need should arise, the common good.

Another maxim: When men take up arms, law is of no consequence or effect.

There is nothing wrong with the Constitution and laws of the United States. They are worth restoring and preserving. The danger of taking up arms is that to do so makes the Constitution and laws of the United States of no effect. To abandon the rule of law is to invite worse tyranny than we have.

Does this rationale stand the acid test? When American founders appealed to the Laws of Nature and Nature's God, they recognized a higher power, knowing man cannot author or amend natural and moral law. It is self-executing, physical law operating in the framework of cause and effect, moral in the framework of cause and consequence. Man may benefit from compliance, or suffer adverse effect and consequence from noncompliance. Truth will ultimately prevail -- it will destroy the destroyer.

Cooperative Federalism defies both physical and moral law. It is predicated on a mathematically impossible economic scheme, and relies on deception and fraud. The system is destined to collapse, very probably ushering in the worst depression in American history. And the names of those responsible will be anathema for generations to come.

Dialectical materialism is an underlying precept of Cooperative Federalism. Karl Marx invented the scheme to rationalize the march of global communism, which relies on perpetual revolution rather than relative stability anchored to time-proven principles. When the Berlin Wall came down, we saw the fall of one of the central icons of the diabolical scheme. It is more than possible for peaceful restoration of constitutional rule in this nation to manifest an even greater miracle to be realized in our time.

Dan Meador

1108 N. 2nd. Street

Ponca City, Okla. 74601

Footnotes

1 The Federal "States" are territories and insular possessions of the United States. Since Alaska and Hawaii were admitted to the Union of several States, there are no territories of the United States as such. The remaining "insular possessions" large enough to be quasi-self-governing include Puerto Rico, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, and the Virgin Islands; the District of Columbia is also a possession of the United States, but falls in a different category as the Constitution authorizes establishing the seat of government at Article I § 8.17, where the other insular possessions have been acquired and are governed under the territorial clause at Article IV § 3.2, cited later in text. In the United States Code, Code of Federal Regulations, etc., these insular possessions are defined as "States". The insular possessions are not incorporated in the constitutional scheme as territories of the United States were, so for many purposes are considered "foreign" to the several States of the Union. This was determined in four insular tax cases in the 1901-1904 period, Downes v. Bidwell (1901) being the first.

2 Downes v. Bidwell (1901) 21 S.Ct. 770, 182 U.S. 244, 45 L.Ed. 1088.

3 What is referred to as the "key-question" survey in this text has been conducted periodically at least since the last decade, with the object being to track population discontent level. Both major political parties, Associated Press, and other enterprises conduct it, particularly prior to and during presidential election years. In November 1996, the "confidence" or trust level was estimated at 15%, in February 1997, at 22%. The more direct "anger" survey was initiated in 1995 by the Scripps Howard News Service. Since then, the peak in articulated "growing" or "increasing" anger with Federal government peaked at about 53%; in early July 1998, "increasing" anger was calculated at 35%, but as Al Gore and various congressional leaders articulated, much of the anger has simply turned to cynicism. The distrust level, which measures broader sentiment, has remained in the approximate 80% range. In spite of continuing efforts to register voters, no more than 40% of those eligible to vote have registered in the 1990's. Senior citizens and professionals are categories most likely to vote; working classes, the unemployed, transients of all descriptions, and younger generations are least likely.

4 Figures concerning incarceration numbers were published by the Department of Justice in 1990 and after. The Federal prison population, at 113,000 in December 1997, is approaching five times what it was in the 1970's. As the "get tough on crime" mania continues, with most who are prosecuted in State and Federal forums charged for "victimless" crime, prison populations will continue to double at eight to ten-year intervals. Figures in the text of this discourse are reconciled with December 1997 Department of Justice Figures, and figures provided by television newsman Ted Koppel in a special on the nation's prison systems. Many of these statistics conflict with 1990 facts and figures provided by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, supposedly from Department of Justice reports. In 1990, State and Federal systems supposedly incarcerated more people on a per-capita basis and in total numbers than any system in the world, South Africa and the old Soviet Union included. Current Department of Justice information very probably is limited to people actually incarcerated "behind the fence" or "behind the wall", without accounting for people on State and Federal supervised release, serving time either in halfway houses or county jails, or incarcerated while awaiting trial via State or Federal courts. The number actually subject to authority of State and Federal corrections systems could easily be three times published figures for imprisonment.

5 Decline of the West, Oswald Spenglar, and what is called the rule of nations or law of empires: No nation or society has ever voluntarily changed unless or until internal degeneration reached a point economic collapse destroyed key social institutions, or unless or until defeated at war. Historical novelist Gore Vidal pointed out that the defeat must be on home ground. Nineteen of 21 known empires collapsed from within prior to 1935.

6 Psalm 10; II Timothy 3: 8 & 9.

7 28 U.S.C. § 132 allegedly establishes a "United States District Court" in each judicial district of the United States. However, by reading historical notes, it is found that this section merges sections from titles 28 & 48 of the United States Code, 1940 edition, with the latter pertaining to territory and insular possessions of the United States. Along with 18 U.S.C. § 7, which merely defines special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States but does not prescribe jurisdiction for any given section of the criminal code, 28 U.S.C. § 132 is among the more sinister decoys in the United States Code. Article III district courts of the United States, defined at 28 U.S.C. § 451, and legitimate territorial courts listed at 18 U.S.C. § 23, are defined as courts of the United States (see 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 610, 753, 1869(f), and elsewhere).

8 For economy of time and space, certain abbreviations are used in this text: U.S.C. = United States Code; "§ "means "section" when reference is to the Constitution of the United States, the United States Code or the Statutes at Large, and "part" when reference is to the Code of Federal Regulations. Therefore, Section 451 of Title 28 of the United States Code = 28 U.S.C. § 451. When references are to the Constitution, Art. or Article IV § 3.2 = Article IV, Section 3, clause 2 of the Constitution. Other abbreviations will be clear from context or noted on first appearance.

9 See 18 U.S.C. § 23, which is 1994 legislation updating the list of three courts, and Rule 54(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for listing of legitimate "Article IV" territorial courts which have somewhat the character and authority of Article III district courts of the United States situated in the Union of several States.

10 Mookini v. United States (1938) 58 S.Ct. 543, 303 U.S. 201, 82 L.Ed. 748, at p. 205.

11 Balzac v. Porto Rico (1922) 42 S.Ct. 343, 258 U.S. 298, 66 L.Ed. 627, at 258 U.S. 312.

12 The first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 3231, 1994 edition, is as follows: "The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States."

13 The territorial clause at Article IV § 3.2 of the Constitution is as follows: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States..."

14 Several court decisions have verified that the United States Code is not "law of the United States." See Murrell v. Western Union Tel. Co., 160 F.2d 787, 788 (1947); United States v. Mercur Corporation, 83 F. 2d 178, 180 (1936); Royer's Inc. v. United States, 265 F.2d 615, 618 (1959). The Royer's case was a decade after Titles 18 & 28 were allegedly enacted as "positive law" and became "legal evidence" of law of the United States.

15 Pub. Law. No. 13, Act of June 10, 1921, Ch. 18, § 301 et seq. See particularly § 305: "Sec. 305. Section 236 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows: ÔSec. 236. All claims and demands whatever by the Government of the United States or against it, and all accounts whatever in which the Government of the United States is concerned, either as debtor or creditor, shall be settled and adjusted in the General Accounting Office.'" Refer to notes following 5 U.S.C. § 5512 to see that the "Solicitor of the Treasury" was merged with functions of the Attorney General via Executive Orders, etc. The necessity for initiating civil action, as well as criminal, is tacitly stated in the Internal Revenue Code at 26 U.S.C. § 7401.

16 See Cervase v. Office of the Federal Register, 580 F.2d 1166 (1978), a Third Circuit case where John Cervase, an attorney, filed a writ of mandamus against the Office of the Federal Register to construct and publish finding aids required by the Federal Register Act (44 U.S.C. § 1510). The case was originally dismissed by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Cervase appealed. The Third Circuit issued the writ of mandamus ordering the Office of the Federal Register to construct the finding aids and the Code of Federal Regulations Index. In the decision, the court noted the purpose of the Federal Register Act (p.p. 1170-71): "But such a construction would fly in the face of the fundamental purpose of the Federal Register Act -- to eliminate the problem of secret law." Regulations governing construction of the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules are at 1 CFR §§ 8. Each department or agency, usually via the chief executive officer, is responsible for maintaining accuracy of the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, so if there is error, liability falls to the department or agency responsible for administering and enforcing any given statute. The Federal Register Act itself was originally passed following the Supreme Court's decision in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432-33, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935).

17 See California Bankers Association v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 39 L. Ed. 2d 812, 94 S.Ct. 1494, United States v. Mersky (1959) 361 U.S. 431, 4 L.Ed.2d, 80 S.Ct. 459, and various other cases. The Supreme Court has likened regulations to "little statutes", and has clearly stated the necessity for implementing regulations before any given statute has the force and effect of law. A statute and its implementing regulation are for all practical purposes inseparable, and one doesn't have lawful effect for general application without the other.

18 Per The United States Government Manual, 1996/97 edition, L. Ralph Mecham presently serves as Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Inquiries should be sent to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building, One Columbus Circle NE., Washington, DC 20544. The telephone number for the Congressional, External, and Public Affairs Office, which is not split, is (202) 273-1120. As of October 1, 1998, people in the Public Information Office have been difficult to move, but the problem should be resolved shortly.

19 Wayman v. Southard (1825) 23 U.S. 1, 6 L.Ed. 253

20 Where Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are concerned, the Supreme Court order of December 27, 1948 amended the rules to apply to the United States District Courts rather than district courts of the United States: "1. That the title of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure be, and it hereby is, amended to read as follows: Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts." The order of December 26, 1944 reads as follows: "It is ordered that Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts of the United States..." Where the rules of civil procedure are concerned, the following is found in the order of December 29, 1948: "1. That the title ÔRules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States' be amended to read ÔRules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts'." These orders are reproduced ahead of rules of procedure in West Publishing desktop editions of titles 18 & 28 of the United States Code, and the 1994 edition of the United States Code.

21 In September 1995, William Cooper and Bill Bentson of Arizona published evidence that the Bureau of Internal Revenue, predecessor of IRS, is an agency of the Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico. Their research documented when and how BIR, Philippines was established, but the precise time BIR, Puerto Rico was established was lost in the shuffle. However, a major breakthrough in this search was recently made: In 1900, Congress created the Puerto Rico Special Fund (Internal Revenue), then in 1934, stipulated that all "funds" would be "trusts", i.e., Puerto Rico Trust #62 (Internal Revenue), which is now administered by the Secretary of the Treasury (see Title 31, U.S.C.). It is almost certain that the provisional government for Puerto Rico created the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico in 1900 or shortly thereafter. As researchers gain access to records of the Puerto Rican provisional government, which operated under directive of what is now the Department of Defense, they are almost certain to find authority which created BIR, Puerto Rico, thus nailing the last element in this search down. The recent finds were by J. Halsbrook.

Dan Meador presents this material on video tape you can buy it online.

Check out our other Public Awareness books, pamphlets and tapes.

 
*****
PRODUCED & DISTRIBUTED BY: Dan & Gail Meador, 1108 N. 2nd Street, Ponca City, Oklahoma 74601; Email: dmeador@poncacity.net
 

Memorandums by Dan Meador and other researchers can be downloaded from Internet on the Law Research & Registry web site: www.LawResearch-Registry.org

In court? Need assistance? Jurisdictionary®

 More Common Law materials.

Top of Page | Master Index | Home | What's New | FAQ | Catalog
Delta Spectrum Research
Pond Science Institute
921 Santa Fe Avenue
La Junta, Colorado 81050
VoiceMail & FAX 720-489-3788
Toll Free for Ordering 866-604-3463
Contact by email
<