The BSE Inquiry / Statement No 23

Scheduled to give evidence on 02/04/98

 

 

THE BSE INQUIRY

Statement of Mark Purdey (23 March 1998)

1. The purpose of my statement is to describe, from the time when BSE was first identified, my actions and statements about BSE and nv CJD and the reasons for my actions and statements. In doing so, I give some background to explain the reasons for my interest. I have a number of criticisms, which I made at the time, which I describe in my statement. I have other criticisms and views which I have submitted to the Inquiry and which I annex to this statement. I entitled it "Short Written Statement to BSE Enquiry; February 1998". I understand that my criticisms and views will be investigated. In this statement I describe what I said and did as a matter of historical fact.

2. I am a dairy farmer currently farming at High Barn Farm, Elworthy, Taunton, Somerset. I was educated at Forres School, Swanage and then was admitted to the scholarship form at Haileybury College, Hertford. In 1972 I declined a university place to study zoology and psychology, in order to start a pioneering organic farming community in the west of Ireland. I have been farming ever since. I am also an independent scientist involved in the aetiology of TSEs, investigating for environmental factors in isolated clusters of TSE all over the world and have published five articles on the BSE/Organo phosphorus theory in peer-reviewed science journals with one article shortly to be published.

3. The Warble Fly Order 1982

In 1984 I was dairy farming at Dene Farm, Halse near Taunton. I had a herd of 80 pedigree Jerseys. My practice had been to use Derris, which is an organic pesticide, to control warble fly when necessary. The substance was on MAFF’s approved list until 1982. Under the Warble Fly Order 1982, however, the Ministry required farmers to treat warble with organophosphorus ("OP") twice a year. Studies had indicated that there was a chance that OP residues could contaminate cows’ milk after treatment. I was also arguing that these chemicals would cause long-term delayed neuro-toxic damage to susceptible types of cows and humans who were exposed. I feared an epidemic of neuro-degenerative disease would ensue as a legacy of the Warble Fly Order. I had used Derris in the past and it achieved 100 per cent success. Derris is a naturally occurring compound and the warble fly larvae are readily killed by two applications a few days apart. I was aware that if cattle were undergoing simultaneous treatment with fly repellents or worm drenches, as well as the OP warblecide, this could affect the balance in the animal’s chemistry. I was also concerned for the welfare of my wife, Margaret, who was then pregnant as there had been cases where farmers’ wives had miscarried after coming into contact with OPs. The Ministry did not accept my arguments and, as my cattle were not treated as required under the 1982 Order, they imposed restrictions on my livestock. There was also a threat of prosecution. I wrote several letters, to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Agriculture, MPs, MAFF’s Advisory Service ("ADAS"), the District Veterinary Officer at Taunton ("DVO"), the Central Veterinary Laboratory ("CVL") and the Health and Safety Executive. The Ministry however did not change their position in support of OP compounds and against Derris (see Mr Lawrence’s letter of 25 January 1985 and the Chief Veterinary Officer’s letter of 4 February 1985).

4. The Ministry informed me that they intended to treat my cattle with the OP compound and to recover their expenses of doing so from me. I decided to take legal advice and challenge the 1982 Order by way of an application for judicial review. I had the support of Dr Alastair Hay, of the Department of Chemical Pathology, Leeds. My lawyers sought an order quashing the Minister’s Enforcement Notice under which the Ministry would have compulsorily treated my cattle with OPs and an order prohibiting the Minister’s proposed treatment. We argued that the Ministry had been acting unlawfully by enforcing treatment with OPs as they had no powers to make the 1982 Order under the Diseases of Animals Act 1950 which only empowered the Minister to enforce treatment with a vaccine or a serum. On 27 March 1985 Mr Justice Woolf granted me leave to apply for judicial review. On 1 April 1985 at the hearing we reached an agreement with the Ministry. My dairy herd were exempted from treatment and my 26 heifers, which had been grazing in the compulsory warble fly zone, had to be treated with ivermectin, a non OP pesticide which makes cows’ milk unfit for human consumption for 28 days.

5. I continued to campaign about the dangers of OPs. In 1987 I submitted evidence to the House of Commons Agriculture Committee inquiry into the effects of pesticides into human health. I linked OPs with brain disorders such as multiple sclerosis and Alzheimer’s disease. I also authored and presented my own BBC2 film "Aggrochemicals" which was shown on 3 June 1988. In 1988 I was appointed an environmental/rural adviser to the BBC Community Programme unit and was responsible for helping in the selection of their films for three years.

6. My reaction to the Wells et al article on BSE in cattle

The article by Dr Wells and others appeared in the "Veterinary Record" in October 1987. I wrote to "Farmers Weekly" in December 1987 querying why the journal had dubbed my postulated link-up between OP exposure and BSE as "ill-informed rumour mongering". I said that –

"My own independent survey on some of the farms inflicted with this crippling neurotoxicity have revealed that warble fly liquids containing "phosmet" and a brand of feeding stuff (compounded from intesticide-treated raw materials) are the common denominators upon these farms. Either, or both, of these inputs could serve as the delayed neurotoxic culprits to those genetically susceptible Holstein cattle bewitched by BSE."

I also pointed out in my letter that Drs Cavanagh and Bouldin had observed "intraneuronal ballooning vacuoles" and "neurofibrillary proteinaceous conglomerations" in the grey matter of the brain stem in degenerating nerve tissue of animals poisoned by OPs. These features resemble major aspects of BSE pathology.

At the time it was believed that Holstein cattle were more prone to BSE. We now know that BSE is a cross-breed problem.

7. The Tyrell Committee report, published 12 July 1990

I wrote a letter to the Farmers Weekly about the report which was published on 3 August 1990. I commented that it seemed "rather foolish that none of the investigative organisations concerned were channelling much energy into solving the missing links surrounding the pathology and prerequisites underlying this "slow viral condition"". I commented further that "I find it interesting that the 250 or so cattle that have grown up through my dairy unit were consistently fed the brands of cake alleged to contain the BSE agent, yet not one of them has developed BSE symptoms. Perhaps the unique feature of my herd is that I have consistently refused and avoided the use of anti- cholinesterase-based insecticides and wormers in my management."

8. "Churnside Birthday" (BSE (No2) Order 1988 : RBSE reference 91/13933)

On 14 July 1991 I wrote to the Chief Veterinary Officer at MAFF as well as the DVO at Taunton about my pedigree jersey cow, "Churnside Birthday", that I had bought into my farm from a chemically run farm and which had developed a "staggers" disorder. After observation, my vets considered that the cow was afflicted with BSE. I raised with the Chief Veterinary Officer the conception that exposure to synthetic or naturally occurring neurotoxicants such as anti-cholinesterases or aluminium containing pollutants were upsetting the cow’s neuro-psychiatric equilibrium. I also pointed out a publication where OPs had been shown to induce spongiform encephalopathy in three victims. I asked for a guarantee that before I handed over the afflicted cow, I should be granted independent access for examination of CNS tissue. Mr Meldrum, the Chief Veterinary Officer, however replied on 25 July 1991 that the Department could not grant me independent access for examination of central nervous system tissues. On 13 November the DVO at Taunton wrote to me to inform me that the laboratory examination identified lesions consistent with BSE and that disease was confirmed in the animal.

9. In early 1992 the Ecologist magazine published my first peer reviewed article on my theory drawing links between BSE and organo-phosphate usage. One of my peer reviewers was Professor Lacey. In my article I said that there was a growing body of evidence that OP insecticides could play a key role in the development of BSE. I noted that the epidemic was worst in areas designated by MAFF as warble fly eradication zones throughout the 1980s. In those areas all cows had to be treated with OPs. Voluntary treatment of cows was urged by MAFF in areas outside the compulsory zones. There was no record of any cow born and raised on an organic farm dying of BSE. The great majority of organic farms had avoided using the high dose type of OP and it is interesting that many cows on those farms may have been fed the concentrates blamed for the disease. I listed similarities between BSE and chronic low dose OP poisoning and pointed out that the chemical had been shown to trigger cancers. I suggested that it might also "switch on" replication of the abnormal prion protein that was supposed to cause BSE. The Western Gazette of 19 March 1992 reported Professor Lacey as saying that "it looks increasingly likely there may be one or more precipitating agents that trigger off BSE and it is possible that insecticides are involved." The Minister continued however to take the view that it was not possible to draw any conclusions in support of my argument (his letter to Mr King MP of 8 June 1992).

Lauderdale Productions, an independent television company, was contracted by Channel 4 to make a documentary about the OP perspective related to BSE. They contacted Dr David Ray, of the Medical Research Council at Leicester, who had just professed an interest in my theory and had invited me to lecture to his Department at the University of Leicester. The Television Company commissioned Dr Ray to test my theory experimentally. David Ray was aware that my theory homed in on the particular OP, Phosmet. Nevertheless the Television Company and the MRC agreed to conduct tests with a chemical that was conveniently available called DFP. DFP is a markedly different type of OP to Phosmet, which is not used on farms. Reluctantly I agreed to this compromise test but on the basis that the oxone metabolite of DFP, the metabolite common also to Phosmet, was used. As the process of the tests was kept secret from me so that the film would contain a surprise element, I was surprised to learn that the oxone metabolite had never in fact been used in the trial. I was aware from the start that recombinant prion protein without a glycolipid anchor was employed. This however weakened the relevance of this trial to duplication of the effects of this chemical in the real world, because I considered that the glycolipid anchor could play a major role in any interaction between OPs and prion protein and their putative role in triggering BSE. When the MRC received the results, they discarded a minute amount of dose proportional binding of DFP to the prion protein, as mere contamination of the protein with an impurity. I was surprised that despite this no tests had been carried out to ascertain any possible protease resistance of the prion protein, even though this was an agreed criterion of the original proposal. When Channel 4 came to pay for this work, I understand that the MRC replied that the work had already been paid for. They did not state who had paid but they did say, "MAFF owned the work".

20. Mrs Browning, the junior Minister at MAFF, wrote a letter to the Daily Mail in November 1995 in which she claimed that my theory on OP initiation of the BSE epidemic had been researched and could not be substantiated. She also gave a written answer to a Parliamentary Question on 19 December 1995 in which she said that government scientists had concluded that my ideas were unsubstantiated as they failed to explain a number of key facts about the disease. She said that the MRC test had found no evidence that OPs bind to the BSE prion protein. She also said that SEAC had not found any evidence in support of my theory.

21. I wrote to Mrs Browning in November 1995 protesting about her letter to the Daily Mail. I wrote to the Minister again on 3 January 1996 informing her that to date I was not aware of any actual government research that has challenged my hypothesis, except for their "hi-jacking" of the research that was originally initiated by Channel 4 TV and the MRC Toxicology Unit. I received a reply from Mrs Browning’s Private Secretary dated 1 February 1996 in which she said that my scientific theory was not tenable. My reaction was predictable. Mr Hogg, who was by then the Minister of Agriculture, wrote a letter to Mr King on 9 January 1996, commenting on Mr King’s letter of 4 December 1995 which enclosed a letter from me. Mr Hogg said that in the light of the MRC research it would not be appropriate or justifiable to use public funds to carry out further research to test my ideas.

 

 

22. My activities since March 1996

I have continued to press the case for my theory since March 1996 in lectures, the media, in correspondence and meetings. Further inaccuracies still emanated from the Ministry. One example was a letter in August or September 1996 from Mr Hogg to Mr King (quoted in Mr King’s letter to me of 24 September 1996) where the Minister stated that MAFF had evidence from the authorities in Switzerland that Phosmet was not used in that country. Switzerland had witnessed 250 odd cases of endemic BSE in its cattle herd.

23. My meeting with SEAC

Prior to February 1997, Lord Lucas, the MAFF spokesman in the House of Lords, gave a written answer to a question from Lord Lester in which he said that the Government had asked SEAC to re-examine my theory. He also indicated that the Government was aware of new research from the Institute of Psychiatry into the effects of Phosmet on prion protein cell cultures. The research in question consisted of experiments commissioned by myself and funded by well-wishers. I was angry that Lord Lucas had erroneously stated that the basis of the OP hypothesis had not been published in peer-reviewed journals, despite the fact that Mrs Gurnhill of MAFF in a letter dated 7 February 1995 acknowledged that one of my articles was peer-reviewed.

24. I was invited to attend the 41^st meeting of SEAC, which was held on 15 April 1997 at MAFF, Tolworth. Also present were Sir Colin Berry, Professor Ian Shaw, Professor Tony Dayan, Professor Ian Aitken, Professor Quentin McKellar, Dr Chris Powell from the Veterinary Products Committee, Mr Horton of the Veterinary Medicines Directorate and Dr Tim Marrs of the Department of Health. After the discussion SEAC asked Sir Colin Berry and Professor Shaw to assess my theory on paper. On the basis of their findings, SEAC would decide whether to advise the Government to fund research into my theory. I was concerned that Sir Colin Berry and Professor Shaw were members of the Government’s Advisory Committee on Pesticides. Would they be able to act impartially? I felt that their response (SEAC 44/1) was toxicologically naïve and full of inaccuracies and misrepresentations of what I had actually said. For instance, they used data solely from the manufacturers of Phosmet. On the basis of this data, they argued that Phosmet would only contaminate the fat of treated animals and would not get into the liver, kidney and muscles. On the basis of this, they argued that Phosmet would not get inside cells. They said that Phosmet would not make contact with prion protein and therefore interact with it. Thus they argued that Phosmet would be unlikely to play a role in the causation of BSE. However, in counter evidence I presented data from peer-reviewed published articles by several teams who had carried out experiments with Phosmet. The articles demonstrated that Phosmet does penetrate liver, kidney and muscles, at twice the intensity that it penetrates the fat. Yet the SEAC conclusions took Sir Colin’s and Professor Shaw’s evidence from the manufacturers as gospel and completely ignored my evidence.

25. Along with other grievances that I had about SEAC’s conclusions on the meeting, I was amazed that they never even considered the findings of the Institute of Psychiatry, which was the prime motivating factor for the SEAC hearing in Lord Lucas’s statement. I was also aggrieved that SEAC said that there was no evidence that OPs were involved in causation of nv CJD, when I pointed out that no studies by the CJD Surveillance Unit had ever been carried out to investigate this possibility.

 

 

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