[The classic way Judges control the truth is to bar witnesses from using certain evidence, and forbidding juries as to come to certain decisions, eg 'that Diana and Dodi were unlawfully killed in a staged accident.' Then the media withhold that fact from the public.
Holocaust trial judges
Lord Justice Sedley
Mr Justice Eady
Sir Nigel Davis & Sir Crispin Davis
[2009 June] Justices should be seen to be done disciplining and even sacking of judges must remain a state secret unless the government chooses to release the information.....The initial decision to protect judges from having their misconduct disclosed was made by the previous lord chancellor, Charles Falconer (so much for his claim to have been a champion of openness), and the decision to waste public money by fighting the Guardian tooth and nail was made by Jack Straw, the justice secretary, who has evidently learned nothing from the MPs' expenses debacle.
[2009 Feb] Corrupt Judges & Psychiatric "Care"-- Jailing Youths Mark A. Ciavarella Jr., and a colleague, Michael T. Conahan, appeared in federal court in Scranton, Pa., to plead guilty to wire fraud and income tax fraud for taking more than $2.6 million in kickbacks to send teenagers to two privately run youth detention centers run by PA Child Care and a sister company, Western PA Child Care.[2008] Unresolved Issues of the Diana and Dodi Inquest by John Morgan
See: Experts Stephen Knight Law Coroners Pathologists Jury Trial
Quotes
Removal
of Murder as a Possible Verdict: On the morning of 31 March, at the start of his summing up, Lord
Justice Scott Baker announced to the jury that he was withdrawing murder from
the possible verdicts available to them. He stated: "My direction in law to you
is that it is not open to you to find that Diana and Dodi were unlawfully killed
in a staged accident" (13.25, 14.1-2). Baker went on to explain: "When a coroner leaves a verdict of unlawful
killing, in this case on the basis of a staged accident, to a jury, he must
identify to the jury the evidence on which they could be sure of such a
conclusion. But in this case sufficient evidence simply does not exist"
(14.11-15). [2008] Unresolved Issues
of the Diana and Dodi Inquest by John Morgan
Confronted by Revisionism, institutions likewise show themselves for what they are: products of circumstantial arrangements on which time has conferred an aura of respectability. The judiciary, for instance, claims to defend justice (a virtue!) or to uphold the law (a necessity), and would have us believe that, as a group, judges care for truth. But, when a judge finds himself obliged to try a Revisionist, how odd to watch as he jettisons the scruples he and his colleagues claim to honor! When faced with a Revisionist, there exists for a judge neither faith, nor law, nor right. In confronting Revisionism, the judiciary shows just how rickety it is. The Adventure of Revisionism
Ernst Zündel had promised that his trial would be "the trial of the Nuremberg Trial" or "the Stalingrad of the "exterminationists." The unfolding of those two long trials proved him right, even though the jury, "instructed" by the judge to consider the Holocaust as an established fact "which no reasonable person can doubt," finally found him guilty. Zündel has already won. It remains for him to make it known to Canada and to the entire world. The media black-out of the 1988 trial was almost complete. Jewish organizations campaigned vigorously for such a blackout, and even went so far as to say that they did not want an impartial account of the trial. They did not want any account of it at all. The paradox is that the only publication which reported relatively honestly about the trial was The Canadian Jewish News. Ernst Zündel and the Leuchter report have left a profound mark on history; both will be remembered for many years to come. The Zündel Trials (1985 and 1988) by ROBERT FAURISSON
In January 1987, a five-judge appeals court decided to throw out the 1985
verdict against Ernst Zündel for some very basic reasons: Judge Hugh Locke had
not allowed the defense any influence in the jury selection process and the jury
had been misled by the judge on the very meaning of the trial. As for me, I have
attended many trials in my life, including some carried out in France during the
period of the "Purge" at the end and after World War II. Never have I
encountered a judge so partial, autocratic and violent as Judge Hugh Locke.
Anglo-Saxon law offers many more guarantees than French law but it only takes
one man to pervert the best of systems. Judge Locke was such a man.
The second trial began on January 18, 1988, under the direction of Judge
Ronald Thomas, who is a friend, it seems, of Judge Locke. Judge Thomas was often
angry and was frankly hostile to the defense, but he had more finesse than his
predecessor. The ruling by the five-judge appeal court also inhibited him
somewhat. Judge Hugh Locke had imposed numerous restrictions on free expression
by the witnesses and experts for the defense. For example, he forbade me to use
any of the photos I had taken at Auschwitz. I had no right to use arguments of a
chemical, cartographical, or architectural nature (even though I had been the
first person in the world to publish the plans for the Auschwitz and Birkenau
crematories). I was not allowed to talk about either the American gas chambers
or the aerial reconnaissance photos of Auschwitz and Birkenau. Even the
testimony of the eminent chemist William Lindsey was cut short. Judge Ronald
Thomas did allow the defense more freedom, but at the outset of the trial, he
made a decision, at the request of the prosecution, that would tie the hands of
the jury. The Zündel Trials (1985 and 1988) by ROBERT
FAURISSON
Judge Ronald Thomas began to label Leuchter's methodology as "ridiculous" and
"preposterous", dismissing many of the report's conclusions on the basis that
they were based on "second-hand information", and refused to allow him to
testify on the effect of Zyklon B on humans because he had never worked with the
substance, and was neither a toxicologist nor a chemist. Mr. Thomas dismissed
Leuchter's opinion because it was of "no greater value than that of an ordinary
tourist", and in regards to Leuchter's opinion said:
“THE COURT: His opinion on this report is that there were never any
gassings or there was never any exterminations carried on in this facility. As
far as I am concerned, from what I've heard, he is not capable of giving that
opinion....He is not in a position to say, as he said so sweepingly in this
report, what could not have been carried on in these facilities.”
—Judge Thomas, Her Majesty the Queen vs. Ernst Zündel, District Court of
Ontario 1988, p. 9049-9050.
When questioned on the functioning
of the crematoria, the judge also prevented Leuchter from testifying because "he
hasn't any expertise". [Wikipedia. See:
Wikipedia]
In Anglo-Saxon law, everything must be proved except for certain absolutely
indisputable evidence ("The capital of Great Britain is London," "day follows
night"... ) The judge can take "judicial notice" of that kind of evidence at the
request of one or the other of the contending parties;
Prosecuting Attorney John Pearson asked the judge to take judicial notice of
the Holocaust. That term then has to be defined. It is likely that, had it not
been for the intervention of the defense, the judge could have defined the
Holocaust as it might have been defined in 1945/46. At that time, the "genocide
of the Jews" (the word "Holocaust" was not used) could have been defined as "the
ordered and planned destruction of six million Jews, in particular by the use of
gas chambers."
The problem for the prosecution was that the defense advised the judge that,
since 1945/46, there have been profound changes in the understanding of Exterminationist historians about the extermination of the Jews. First of all,
they no longer talk about an extermination but about an attempted
extermination.. They have also finally admitted that "in spite of the most
scholarly research" (Raymond Aron, Sorbonne Convenffon, 2 July 1982), no one has
found any trace of an order to exterminate the Jews. More recently, there has
been a dispute between the "intentionalists" and the "functionalists." Both
agree that they have no proof of any intent to exterminate, but "intentionalist"
historians nevertheless believe that one must assume the existence of that
intent, while "functionalist" historians believe that the extermination was the
result of individual initiatives, localized and anarchic: in a sense, the
activity created the organization! Finally, the figure of six million was
declared to be "symbolic" and there have been many disagreements about the
"problem of the gas chambers."
Obviously surprised by this flood of information, Judge Ronald Thomas decided
to be prudent and, after a delay for reflection, decided on the following
definition; the Holocaust, he said, was "the extermination and/or mass-murder of
Jews" by National Socialism. His definition is remarkable for more than one
reason. We no longer find any trace of an extermination order, or a plan, or
"gas chambers," or six million Jews or even millions of Jews. This definition is
so void of all substance that it no longer corresponds to anything real. One
cannot understand the meaning of "mass-murder of Jews." (The judge carefully
avoided saying "of the Jews".) This strange definition is itself a sign of the
progress achieved by Historical Revisionism since 1945.
The Zündel Trials (1985 and 1988) by ROBERT
FAURISSON
"There's this judge whose been a friend of the family ever since I was a
child, he almost always comes to Sunday dinner, he's that sort of really close
friend of the family, I'll try asking him about these strange deaths."
He managed to get this judge along to an Edinburgh pub to sit and chat, but
kept the conversation absolutely mundane for a long time. He then enquired:
"Er, what do you think about this Marconi business?"
The judge put the pint of beer down, said "Good-day" arose from his seat and
walked right out the door. The student and his family never saw him again at
their house.