Accountability and Risk in the Information Era: Lessons Drawn From the “Cold Fusion” "Furor"
Prepared by Dr. Scott Chubb, Naval Research Laboratory 
October 6, 2000 
Background
Nature does not lie. But it can fool us. Also, we frequently fool ourselves. When media attention, the politics of money and prestige, the possibility of extraordinary wealth, and the fear of embarrassment also become part of the equation, the resulting situation can rapidly escalate into a minefield of confusion. For this reason, “taking risks,” especially about areas involving science and technology, always can be dangerous. When opinion becomes part of the process, risk-taking can take on an identity of its own. 
An extreme example of this occurred eleven years ago when Stanley Pons and Martin Fleischmann (PF) took an “extraordinary risk” by “implying” it was possible to “create a room-temperature hydrogen bomb in a test-tube”1. Almost immediately, their “suggestion” “for new research” “not only ‘was’ ‘discredited’”, but with time, scorn and ridicule (even open harassment) routinely became part of the lives of individuals who have paid attention to it2. However, despite the apparent meltdown, in public opinion, about Cold Fusion (CF), CF research has continued. An obvious question is why?
What’s New: 
Clearly, one might ask one of two questions: 1. “Are those who remained involved ‘fooling nature’ or ‘themselves’?,” or 2. “Are those who are ‘responsible’ ‘for’ ‘harassing’ those who have remained involved ‘been fooled’?” In fact, at the core of both questions are two key issues: 1. The degree that individuals (or groups of individuals) can take “risks” and also avoid “appearing” to be “foolish”, or when or how (as a result of policy decisions, for example) can the “perception of appearing to be foolish” be “augmented” in a useful way to such a degree that a “useful” way “to be foolish” can occur, or 2. How, given the need to satisfy budget constraints and be “persuasive and credible”, do we deal with ideas that are difficult to accept?
Recently, while serving as guest editor of an Ethics in Science journal, titled “Accountability in Research3,” I dealt with this issue. Specifically, I asked a number of senior individuals on both sides of the Cold Fusion debate to deal with the following question: regardless of whether or not Cold Fusion (CF) claims have merit, were (or are) there lessons that can be learned from the on-going situation? Almost universally, the various authors agreed on three general ideas: 1. “Normal” scientific discussion about CF ended at a very early stage, 2. The “breakdown” of “Normal” scientific discussion not only has not been widely accepted outside the field, but 3. Although the reasons for this “breakdown” are not clear, the “failure” by particular “individuals” or “institutions” to be held “accountable” for past actions has been largely responsible for this problem. Implicit in these assertions is an obvious point. “Cold Fusion” “was” “and is” a “risky” “form” of “science.” “Discussions about CF” have “ceased” “to be” “normal” “for precisely this reason.” But there is a more poignant message: despite the fact that research in CF has continued, not only have the initial “critics” largely avoided the subject, even though many of their criticisms have been adequately addressed, most scientists are simply unaware of this fact. An important reason for this is that many of the institutions that are involved either in disseminating information about science or in adjudicating science have largely ignored what has been going on.
Impact:
There is an important lesson associated with this that applies not only in science, but in most forms of human interaction. For communication to occur, some form of accountability is necessary. (This is especially true when risk is involved.) Institutions and individuals must be held accountable for their actions for an obvious reason: the need to maintain trust. Specifically, when a particular party or group requests that an individual or institution be held accountable for a particular action, implicitly, trust occurs. This is because at a very basic level, for communication to occur at all, it is necessary that the parties mutually trust each other. The process of assigning accountability for a particular action involves the identification of a particular liability (or responsibility) that can be directly associated with a particular action. When the associated liability or responsibility is clearly identifiable, the degree of accountability can be quantified. Because in situations involving risk, the associated liability can be difficult to define, procedures for assigning accountability become less tangible.
In “normal” circumstances, “liability” and “responsibility” and “accountability” not only can all be identified and related to each other but can be quantified either by precedent or through the potential for pecuniary damages or rewards (as defined through the marketplace, for example). Thus, typically, accountability can be measured using flows of information, ideas, money, or technology, almost in terms of a marketplace type of scenario. Then “liability” and “responsibility” can be defined in terms of how these processes are enhanced or impeded by a particular set of actions. When “risk” becomes part of the “scenario”, however, this picture becomes altered, significantly.
For this reason, within the context of “normal” science, it is relatively easy to identify the terms of accountability. However, when the relevant “science” ceases to be “normal,” because of “risk,” the terms associated with accountability cease to be as clearly defined. In fact, “risk” “as it applies to CF”, in a grander context, also applies to “bold” or “new” initiatives. And many of the lessons from the CF controversy involving “risk" can be viewed as having more-far-reaching lessons associated in policy-decisions involving a particular individual or groups of individuals.
Ironically, in the case of CF, the advent of Information Era technologies seems to have eroded the underlying communication problem. In particular, at an early stage, considerable confusion occurred as a result of the widespread dissemination of incomplete (and incorrect) information about the associated experiments, by FAX machines, and through the Internet. The resulting "discourse" quickly became distorted. This situation not only seriously undermined the scientific review process but seems to have been at least partly responsible for the fact that established scientific journals do not publish information about CF. 
In the talk, I will summarize my involvement with CF, as well as several important conclusions that I have summarized in my Introduction to the special two issue collection of articles from the Ethics in Science journal, Accountability in Research3, where a number of senior individuals involved in the controversy have examined the associated breakdown in scientific dialogue, about this topic. Important implications of the work include the need for greater investment in Science in “formal” and “informal” “ways”. In particular, it is apparent that a “rush-to-judge” mentality was present in 1989 that clearly was related to funding (or loss of funding). This not only included a number of “obvious ‘non-scientific’ ‘events’, and ‘reviews’” involving a number of organizations (most notably the American Physical Society, the Department of Energy, and the Patent Office)” but other actions, including non-scientific intervention (involving the American Physical Society and the Department of Energy) that appear to have been prompted by a lack of sufficient funding.
The effect of this process is simple: after 11 years, not only have the relevant scientific issues not been adequately represented, serious questions about the adjudication process that is responsible for this should be addressed. The Congress, the President, and the Courts are the final bodies that “should be ‘held’ ‘accountable’”, with regard to these issues. Science can not be objective when the “bodies” “that ‘hold’ ‘Science’ ‘captive’” are not willing to “investigate” “Science.” It is not only plausible but likely that others, besides those involved with the government, will be assigned “blame” “for injustices” associated with “Cold Fusion.” However, I believe this view is shortsighted. In my opinion, the institutions mirror investment. Scientists will only feel free to take risks when they are sufficiently protected to do so. In 1945, we felt compelled to “protect science.” In 2000, this seems to be a forgotten message. Innovative Energy ideas, “risky ideas” (which “wouldn’t be ‘so risky’ if scientists had adequate funding”) are left unexplored, as a consequence. 
References:
1This quote paraphrases comments from a number of popular sources of information (the popular press, newspapers, etc). It typifies the kind of imprecise, anecdotal information about Cold Fusion that, somewhat surprisingly, is still commonly believed to have been attributed to Pons and Fleischmann, and Jones et al. In fact, compelling evidence exists that novel forms of nuclear reaction exist, without high energy particles; http://www.infinite-energy.com.
2 Charles G.Beaudette, Excess Heat: Why Cold Fusion Research Prevailed. (Oak Grove Press, LLC, ME, 2000). (ISBN 09678548-06; available throughhttp://www.amazon.com,http://www.infinite-energy.com; hardcover $36.95; softcover $26.95, distributed by INGRAM and Infinite-Energy Press).
3Scott R. Chubb, “Introduction to the Special Collection of Articles in Accountability in Research Dealing With ‘Cold Fusion’”, in Accountability in Research, v. 8, #1 and #2. (eds. A. E. Shamoo, and S. R. Chubb, Gordon and Breach, Philadelphia, 2000). (http://www.gbhap-us.com/journals/149/149-top.htm)
The Author
Dr. Scott ChubbResearch Physicist at the Naval Research Laboratory (Sept., 1989-present): His research areas are in: Remote Sensing of the Ocean (1989-present), Precision Time and Space (Space Technology Division,1989-1994), related to atomic clocks, General and Special Relativity; investigated applications of microwaves in surveillance of the ocean (1989-2000). Assessed applicability of Cold Nuclear Fusion (1989-1990) for DoD; served in advisory role with regard to associated developments (1989-2000). He has published over 50 scientific papers in various areas of physics including a number in the area of cold fusion.